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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the mid-1980s, the U.S. Supreme Court has developed a 
Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") jurisprudence that has become in-
creasingly preemptive of state efforts to regulate arbitration. 1 During 
this same period, however, state legislatures and courts have force-
fully sought in a vast array of contexts to regulate and, indeed, to 
invalidate arbitration agreements that the legislatures or the courts 
have perceived as threatening the interests of the state, its busi-
nesses, its consumers, or its workers.2 Much of this state arbitration 
legislation and case law is curious in that it was so evidently pre-
empted at its inception under the U.S. Supreme Court's then existing 
FAAjurisprudence,3 Indeed, Professor Sarah Rudolph Cole has spec-
ulated that states may be enacting arbitration legislation that is 
seemingly preempted by the FAA as a "purely symbolic" gesture or in 
1. See, e.g., Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy, Stolt-Niel-
sen, Rent-A-Center, Concepcion, and the Future of American Arbitration, 22 AM. REv. 
lNT'L Ann. 323, 325-26 (2011) (commenting that the Supreme Court's most recent 
arbitration jurisprudence "reflect[s] the increasingly extreme pro-arbitration slant of 
recent decades" and "vastly expands the po,ver of companies to impose and control 
arbitration procedures while tying the hands of state legislatures and courts"). 
2. See, e.g., Sarah Rudolph Cole, Uniform Arbitration: "One Size Fits All" Does 
Not Fit, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON Dlsp, RESOL, 759, 785-87 (2001) (discussing various state 
statutes that purport to protect certain categories of disputants from compliance with 
predispute arbitration agreements); Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 724 S.E.2d 
250, 278, 292 (W, Va. 2011) (criticizing the U.S. Supreme Court for its "tendentious 
reasoning" in expansively interpreting the FAA and holding that "as a matter of pub-
lic policy under West Virginia law, an arbitration clause in a nursing home admission 
agreement adopted prior to an occurrence of negligence that results in a personal 
injury or wrongful death, shall not be enforced to compel arbitration of a dispute con-
cerning the negligence"), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012). 
3. See, e.g., Marmet Health Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1202--03 (2012) 
(per curiam opinion rebuking the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia for "mis-
reading and disregarding the precedents of [the U.S. Supreme Court] interpreting the 
FAA" and noting that "[t)he West Virginia court's interpretation of the FAA was both 
incorrect and inconsistent with clear instruction in the precedents of [the] Court"); 
Nitro-Lift Techs., LLC. v. Howard, 133 S. Ct. 500, 501, 503, 504 (2012) (per curiam 
opinion chastising the Oklahoma Supreme Court for "ignor[ing) a basic tenet of the 
[Federal Arbitration) Act's substantive arbitration law," namely the Prima Paint doc-
trine, and adding for good measure that "[t)here is no general-specific exception to the 
Supremacy Clause"); Cole, supra note 2, at 786, 789 (labeling various state legislation 
disfavoring arbitration agreements relating to certain categories of disputes "interest-
ing in light of the fact that the FAA likely preempts any categorical exclusions from a 
state uniform arbitration ac~'); Alan Scott Rau, The Culture of American Arbitration 
and the Lessons of ADR, 40 TEx. INT'L L.J. 449, 452 n.11 (2005) (widely-published 
arbitration scholar stating that he "can't even begin to understand the California Su-
preme Court's decision in Broughton u. Cigna Healthplans of California" which held 
that claims for public injunctive relief under California's Consumer Legal Remeclies 
Act are not subject to arbitration). 
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the hope that such legislation might spur Congress to amend the 
FAA to allow states greater leeway to regulate arbitration. 4 Then 
again, state legislatures and courts might simply perceive that the 
need for certain arbitration regulation is so great that it is best to 
proceed with arguably preempted regulation until the U.S. Supreme 
Court rules that the FAA preempts the specific state effort at issue. 5 
Employment arbitration has long been a favorite target of these 
state legislative and judicial efforts. 6 California law provides the 
prime example. 7 California's legislature and courts have been among 
the most aggressive in seeking to limit arbitration.a Thus, it is likely 
more than coincidence that a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court's 
4. Cole, supra note 2, at 789. 
5. See, e.g., Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931, 940 (Mont. 1994), rev'd, 517 
U.S. 681 (1996) (Trieweiler, J., specially concurring) (castigating the federal judiciary 
for an arbitration jurisprudence characterized by a "type of arrogance [that] not only 
reflects an intellectual detachment from reality, but [also] a self-serving disregard for 
the purposes for which courts exist"); Truly Nolan of Arn. v. Superior Court, 208 145 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 432, 434 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (stating in dicta that, "Although Concep-
cion's reasoning strongly suggests that Gentry's holding is preempted by federal law, 
the United States Supreme Court did not directly rule on the class arbitration issue in 
the context of unwaivable statutory rights and the California Supreme Court has not 
yet revisited Gentry [and t]hus, we continue to be bound by Gentry under California's 
stare decisis principles"); Kinecta Alternative Fin. Solutions, Inc. v. Superior Court, 
140 Cal. Rptr. 3d 347, 355 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (stating in dicta that "[a] question 
exists about whether Gentry survived the overruling of Discover Bank in Concepcion," 
but 11[s]ince it has not been expressly abrogated or overruled, Gentry appears to re-
main the binding law in California"). 
6. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 2, at 786 (noting that "[alt least twelve states have 
specifically exempted non-union employer-employee disputes from coverage of that 
state's arbitration act"); Howard v. Nitro-Lift Techs., LLC., 273 P.3d 20, 27 (Okla. 
2011) (holding "tbat the existence of an arbitration agreement in an employment con-
tract does not prohibit judicial review of the underlying agreement"), vacated, 133 S. 
Ct. 500 (2012). 
7. See, e.g., infra notes 79-193 and accompanying text (discussing California's 
four principal employment arbitration doctrines). 
8. See, e.g., Broughton v Cigna Healthplans of Cal., 988 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999) 
(holding that claims for public injunctive relief under the California Consumer Legal 
Remedies Act designed to protect the public from deceptive business practices are not 
subject to arbitration); Cruz v. PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc., 66 P.3d 1157 (Cal. 2003) 
(extending Broughton's holding to include claims to enjoin unfair competition under 
California's Unfair Competition Law and claims to enjoin false advertising under Cal-
ifornia Business and Professions Code section 17500); Stephen A. Broome, An Uncon-
scionable Application of the Unconscionability Doctrine: How the California Courts 
Are Circumventing the Federal Arbitration Act, 3 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 39, 41 (2006) 
(concluding that "California courts are clearly biased against arbitration" and "[t]heir 
disdain manifests in unique unconscionability requirements applicable solely when 
arbitration agreements are at issue and in lower standards for demonstrating uncon-
scionability in the arbitration context"); Stipanowich, supra note 1, at 353 (noting that 
California courts "have been considerably more energetic" than other state courts in 
utilizing unconscionability doctrine to deny enforcement of arbitration agreements). 
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landmark FAA preemption cases have arisen in the context of chal-
lenges to California statutory or case law.9 Two of these landmark 
cases involved successful challenges to California regulation of arbi-
tration in the context of the employment relationship.10 
Nonetheless, especially in the context of employment arbitration 
agreements, the California courts have remained undeterred by the 
mere Supremacy Clause in their efforts to protect the public interest 
and the interests of workers. Specifically, they have prohibited whole 
categories of employment claims from arbitration imposed by the em-
ployer as a condition of employment. Indeed, in a jurisprudence that 
has been characterized by its creativity if not willful blindness to U.S. 
Supreme Court precedents, the California Supreme Court has cre-
ated a series of four employment arbitration doctrines each of which 
from its inception has been of dubious validity from a preemption 
standpoint: 11 each of these doctrines is grounded on the "effective 
vindication of unwaivable state statutory rights exception" to FAA 
preemption (hereinafter state effective-vindication exception) - an 
arbitration branch of public policy doctrine that has never enjoyed 
firm support in the U.S. Supreme Court's FAAjurisprudence.12 
States aside from California also have long used public policy 
and the state effective-vindication exception as justification for regu-
lating employment arbitration.13 Yet no other state has done so to the 
9. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 17 40, 1753 (2011) (holding 
that the FAA preempts California's judicially-created "Discover Bank" rule classifying 
as unconscionable most consumer contract collective-arbitration waivers); Preston v. 
Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 359 (2008) (holding that the FAA preempts the section of the 
California Talent Agencies Act vesting in the California Labor Con1missioner "exclu-
sive original jurisdiction" over claims arising under the act); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. 
Leland Stanford Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 470, 479 (1989) (holding that the FAA does not 
preempt a provision of the California Arbitration Act allowing a court to stay arbitra-
tion pending resolution of related litigation if the parties have agreed that the provi-
sion shall govern their arbitration); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 491 (1987) 
(holding that the FAA preempts the section of the California Labor Code providing 
that an action to collect wages may proceed notwithstanding an agreement to arbi-
trate); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (holding that the FAA 
preempts the section of the California Franchise Investment Law requiring judicial 
consideration of claims brought under the California statute). 
10. See Preston, 552 U.S. at 354 (challenge to California regulation of those "who 
engage{] in the occupation of procuring, offering, promising, or attempting to procure 
employment or engagements for an artist or artists"); Perry, 482 U.S. at 483 (chal-
lenge to California Labor Code provision regarding wage disputes). 
11. See infra notes 79-193 and accompanying text. 
12. See infra notes 62--08 and accompanying text. 
13. See, e.g., Machado v. System4 LLC, 989 N.E.2d 464, 470 (Mass. 2013) (ex-
tending public-policy-based state effective-vindication exception to arbitration agree-
ment as related to claims by employees under the Massachusetts Wage Act); Warfield 
v. Beth Israel Deaconess Med. Ctr., Inc., 910 N.E.2d 317, 325, 326 n.16 (Mass. 2009) 
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extent that California has. Thus, this Article focuses on California's 
employment arbitration doctrine to demonstrate two critical points of 
general application. First, California's employment arbitration doc-
trine illustrates the extent to which state courts have been willing to 
turn a blind eye to the U.S. Supreme Court's FAAjurisprudence in an 
effort to further the public policies that ground employment regula-
tion. Second, California's employment arbitration doctrine allows for 
an exploration of the extent to which the U.S. Supreme Court's most 
recent FAA jurisprudence impairs the ability of the states to safe-
guard the public interest and the interests of workers through em-
ployment arbitration regulation. 14 Both of these points inform the 
Article's reform proposal that follows. This discussion demonstrates 
the urgent need for an amendment to the FAA that will allow states 
to regulate employment arbitration so as to protect the public inter-
est and the interests of workers. This discussion also demonstrates 
the need for federal oversight of this state regulation so as to protect 
(holding that in light of "an "overriding" statutorily expressed public policy against 
discrimination" an employment arbitration agreement relating to claims arising 
under Massachusetts's employment discrimination statute "is enforceable only if such 
an agreement is stated in clear and unmistakable terms"); Cardiovascular Surgical 
Specialists, Corp. v. Mammana, 61 P.3d 210, 213 (Okla. 2002) (commenting that 
Oklahoma's statute limiting the enforcement of covenants not to compete "was en-
acted to protect the people" and, holding therefore that "this public right cannot be 
waived by the parties' agreement to submit the issue of the validity of a contract pro-
vision to arbitration"); Rembert v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 596 N.W.2d 208, 
226, 228-30 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that "predispute agreements to arbitrate 
statutory employment claims are valid if [among other things] the arbitration agree-
ment does not waive the substantive rights and remedies of the statute and the arbi-
tration procedures are fair so that the employee may effectively vindicate his 
statutory rights" and setting out the arbitration procedures that must be included for 
such an arbitration agreement to be valid); see also Sutherland v. Ernst & Young 
LLP, 768 F. Supp.2d 547, 549, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), reu'd, 726 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2013) 
(applying the federal and state effective-vindication exceptions to invalidate an arbi-
tration agreement as it related to ·an employee's collective and cJass action claims for 
overtime under respectively the Fair Labor Standards Act and New York state law). 
14. For examples from outside of California of the U.S. Supreme Court's most 
recent FAA jurisprudence being used to invalidate state public-policy based employ-
ment arbitration regulation, see Machado v. System4 LLC, 993 N.E.2d 332, 333 
(Mass. 2013) (concluding that the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in American Express 
Co. u. Italian Colors Restaurant "abrogates" the earlier holding of the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court applying the state effective-vindication exception in the context of 
claims by employees under the Massachusetts Wage Act); Sutherland v. Ernst & 
Young LLP, 726 F.3d 290, 292 & n.1 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding in light of the U.S. Su-
preme Court's holding in American Express Co. u. Italian Colors Restaurant that the 
effective·vindication exception may not be applied to invalidate a class-action waiver 
provision in an arbitration agreement even if the waiver removes an employee's in-
centive to bring an overtime claim under New York labor law). 
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the interest of employers and employees in the efficient resolution of 
employment disputes. 
In light of the U.S. Supreme Court's 2011 decision in AT&T Mo· 
bility LLC u. Concepcion15 and the Court's 2013 decision in American 
Express Co. u. Italian Colors Restaurant, 16 it is now abundantly clear 
that in this game of preemption chess, the players have come to 
checkmate. Neither of these recent Supreme Court cases involved 
employment arbitration. MOl'eover, the latter case did not involve 
FAA preemption whatsoever. Nonetheless, together Concepcion and 
Italian Colors Restaurant obliterate the state effective-vindication 
exception and with it much of the employment arbitration regulation 
grounded on the exception. Thus, for states that seek to regulate 
predispute employment arbitration agreements, the time has come to 
settle upon the most favorable terms of surrender that can be negoti-
ated. This Article proposes, therefore, a tactical retreat for the states 
pursuant to which a state may continue to regulate predispute em-
ployment arbitration agreements only after a federal overseer, such 
as the U.S. Department of Labor, has preapproved the specific 
regulation. 
Part I of this Article distills from the U.S. Supreme Court's FAA 
preemption jurisprudence the eight fundamental principles of FAA 
preemption. Part II considers the status of the state effective-vindica-
tion exception to the FAA's application in light of Concepcion and 
Italian Colors Restaurant. Part III details how California courts have 
attempted to skirt the U.S. Supreme Court's FAA jurisprudence to 
safeguard the public interest and workers' rights and how Concepcion 
and Italian Colors Restaurant nullify these efforts. This Part de-
scribes California's various employment arbitration doctrines and 
then applies the fundamental principles of FAA preemption to 
demonstrate that the FAA, as the U.S. Supreme Court has inter-
preted it, preempts each of these doctrines. Finally, Part IV suggests 
a way forward. This Part argues that a state should have the ability 
to regulate predispute employment arbitration agreements so as to 
protect the ability of its workers to vindicate their state statutory 
rights. This Part further argues, however, that a fedel'al overseer 
with expertise in workplace law matters should have veto power over 
15. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
16. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
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any such proposed regulation so as to maintain an appropriate bal-
ance between the public policies that ground state employment regu-
lation on the one hand and a desire promote the FAA's policy in favor 
of enforcing arbitration agreements as written on the other. 
II. A PRIMER ON FAA PREEMPTION 
A. The Eight Fundamental Principles of FAA Preemption 
Section 2 of the FAA of provides that, 
A written provision in ... a contract evidencing a transaction 
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy there-
after arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to 
perform the whole or any part thereof ... shall be valid, irrevo-
cable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law 
or in equity for the revocation of any contract.17 
The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted this language in such a 
way that the FAA preempts a wide range of state efforts to regulate 
arbitration contracts. From the U.S. Supreme Court's FAA jurispru-
dence, one is able to distill the following principles that mark the pa-
rameters of FAA preemption of state arbitration law: (1) the FAA 
creates a substantive rule that applies in state courts as well as in 
federal courts and preempts conflicting state law;18 (2) the FAA ap-
plies to any arbitration agreement that Congress would have the au-
thority to regulate using the full extent of its Commerce Clause 
power;19 (3) a state may not invalidate an arbitration agreement 
under a state law that is "not applicable to contracts generally'' even 
ifthe state law does not undermine arbitration;20 (4) a state law may 
not "stand[] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of 
the full purposes and objectives" of the FAA;21 (5) FAA preemption 
applies notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies 
to the contrary: the importance of a state public policy is irrelevant to 
FAA preemption analysis;22 (6) a state may not require a judicial or 
administrative forum for the resolution of claims that the contracting 
17. 9 u.s.c. § 2 (1947). 
18. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12-16 (1984). 
19. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 268 (1995). 
20. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996). 
21. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Leland Stanford Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477-78 (1989) 
(quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
22. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983); 
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehmau Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 55, 58 (1995). 
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parties have agreed to resolve by arbitration;23 and (7) it is no de-
fense to FAA preemption that the state-mandated forum is but a first 
stop before arbitration is allowed.24 This Article will more fully dis-
cuss these principles below in conjunction with a discussion of how 
these principles act to preempt Califorma's principal employment ar-
bitration doctrines. 
Although the scope of FAA preemption is broad, the statute does 
allow for some state regulation of arbitration contracts that are 
within the FAA's purview. Recall section 2's Saving Clause, which 
provides that a state may regulate an arbitration contract governed 
by the FAA "upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract." It is accepted that such grounds include 
fraud, duress, and unconscionability. 25 
The precise meaning and effect of the Saving Clause, however, 
remain topics for debate in the courts and in the academic litera-
ture. 26 To bring this debate into focus, assume for purposes of discus-
sion that a state wishes to invalidate any arbitration agreement that 
does not allow for class action arbitration. The fundamental princi-
ples of FAA preemption set out above make clear that a state legisla-
ture may not enact a statute that expressly invalidates any 
arbitration agreement that does not allow for class action arbitration, 
for such a statute would both impermissibly single out arbitration 
contracts and impermissibly stand as an obstacle to the execution of 
the FAA's objectives. This is so even if the statute is grounded on 
express legislative findings about the important public policy reasons 
for the statute. Moreover, the fundamental principles of FAA pre-
emption also make clear that a state court may not announce a rule 
that expressly invalidates any arbitration agreement that does not 
23. Preston v. Ferrer, 522 U.S. 346, 349-50 (2008); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 
483, 491 (1987). 
24. Preston, 522 U.S. at 354-58. One might read Preston as holding only that a 
state may not mandate a judicial or administrative forum as a first stop before arbi· 
tration where the detour would "hinder speedy resolution of the controversy." Id. at 
358. This author does not read Preston so narrowly. 
25. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746 (2011). 
26. See, e.g., David Horton1 Federal Arbitration Act Preempti.on, Purposivis1n, 
and State Public Policy, 101 GEO. L.J. 1217, 1224 (2013) (arguing that the Saving 
Clause preserves an application of state public policy that nullifies an arbitration pro-
vision when such application is grounded on a "well-supported determination that 
doing so· is necessary to preserve substantive rights or remedies"); Michael J. 
Yelnosky, Fully Federalizing the Federal Arbitration Act, 90 OR. L. REV. 729, 734 
(2012) (arguing that "the savings clause should never have been read to require the 
application of state law to disputes over the enforceability of arbitration agreements 
covered by the FAA [but rather] should be read to authorize federal courts to create 
federal common law to govern the enforcement of covered arbitration agreements"). 
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allow for class action arbitration: the FAA is indifferent as to whether 
the state acts through its legislature or its courts. 
Given these restrictions, some courts nonetheless have used gen-
eral contract principles such as unconscionability and public policy to 
invalidate arbitration contracts that do not allow for class action ar-
bitration.27 The defense of such an approach relies upon the Saving 
Clause and is two-fold: First, it is argued that unconscionability and 
public policy can be applied to invalidate any contract. 28 Second, the 
argument is made that these decisions do not single out arbitration 
given that a contract that purported to preclude class actions in court 
would also be held to be unconscionable or against public policy. 29 
If one were to accept that a state may limit arbitration agree-
ments in this way, by means of such "general contract defenses," 
might a state also declare unconscionable or against public policy any 
arbitration agreement that does not allow for all the discovery availa-
ble in court, the application of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and a 
unanimous decision by twelve arbitrators chosen from a jury pool as-
sembled by a specified authority and procedure? The Supreme 
Court's 2011 decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion makes 
clear that section 2's Saving Clause is not allowed to swallow up the 
rest of section 2 in such a way.30 Rather, application of the general 
contract doctrine must not disadvantage arbitration such that the ap-
plication stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA's 
purposes and objectives.31 More specifically, Concepcion teaches that 
application of the general contract doctrine must not frustrate "the 
enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms so as 
to facilitate streamlined proceedings."32 
Each of these formulations of the holding in Concepcion is largely 
derivative of several of the seven fundamental principles of FAA pre-
emption set out above. Thus, in one sense, Concepcion adds nothing 
new to the law of FAA preemption. But there are also strong argu-
ments that Concepcion in fact adds a great deal. For in applying set-
tled principles to delineate the scope of the Saving Clause, 
27. See Gentry v. Superior Court, 165 P.3d 556, 563--S9 (Cal. 2007); Discover 
Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1108-10 (Cal. 2005). 
28. See Gentry, 165 P.3d at 559; Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1111-12. 
29. See Gentry, 165 P.3d at 465; Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1111-12; cf. Sonic-
Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 247 P.3d 130, 147-48 (Cal. 2011), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 496 
(2011). 
30. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1747-48. 
31. Id. at 1748, 1753. 
32. Id. 
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Concepcion makes clear an eighth fundamental principle of FAA pre-
emption: state regulation of arbitration agreements pursuant to the 
Saving Clause is subject to the first seven fundamental principles of 
FAA preemption. 
B. Section 2's Saving Clause After AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion 
This Article posits that the FAA, as the U.S. Supreme Court has 
recently interpreted it, imperils the public policies that ground state 
regulation of the employment relationship. Concepcion's holding and 
its reasoning are central to that ai·gument.33 It is useful, therefore, to 
consider more fully Concepcion's holding and reasoning before turn-
ing to a consideration of the relationship between the FAA and state 
public-policy-based employment arbitration regulation. 
The general issue in Concepcion was "whether the FAA prohibits 
States from conditioning the enforceability of certain arbitration 
agreements on the availability of classwide arbitration procedures."34 
The more specific issue in the case was whether section 2 preempts 
California's "Discover Bank" rule.35 That rule classified most collec-
tive-arbitration waivers in consumer contracts as unconscionable. 36 
Discover Bank v. Superior Court was a 2005 California Supreme 
Court case in which the court held that class action waivers should 
not be enforced if (1) "the waiver is found in a consumer contract of 
adhesion [(2)] in a setting in which disputes between the contracting 
parties predictably involve small amounts of damages, and [(3)] when 
it is alleged that the party with the superior bargaining power has 
carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consum-
ers out of individually small sums of money."37 The California Su-
preme Court reasoned that, in such circumstances, "the [class action] 
waiver becomes in practice the exemption of the party from responsi-
bility for its own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of 
33. Cf. David Horton, Mass Arbitration and Democratfo Legitimacy, 85 U. Cow. 
L. REV. 459, 502 (2014) (arguing that Concepcion and Italian Colors Restaurant have 
enabled corporations and employers to utilize adhesive consumer and employment 
arbitration contracts to "displace democratically~created rights"); David Korn & David 
Rosenberg, Concepcion's Pro-Defendant Biasing of the Arbitration Process: The Class 
Counsel Solution, 46 U. MrcH. J.L. REFORM 1151, 1200 (2013) (concluding that "Con· 
cepcion broke a carclinal rule supported by longstanding precedent: agreements to ar· 
bitrate future claims shall not undermine the law's social objectives by forcing a party 
to forego effective enforcement of his or her substantive claims of right'». 
34. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744. 
35. Id. at 1746. 
36. Id. 
37. Discover Bank v, Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005). 
12 Harvard Negotiation Law Review [Vol. 20:1 
another [and, thus,] such waivers are unconscionable under Califor-
nia law and should not be enforced."38 In Concepcion, the U.S. Su-
preme Court held that the FAA preempted California's Discover 
Bank rule. 
The Court in Concepcion expressly rejected the argument that 
the Discover Bank rule was compatible with section 2 because it was 
a ground that existed at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract given its origins in unconscionability doctrine and the public 
policy against exculpation.39 The Court also expressly rejected the ar-
gument that the Discover Bank rule was compatible with section 2 
because it applied to class action waivers in litigation as well as arbi-
tration.40 Thus, Concepcion makes clear that these two prerequisites 
to state invalidation of an arbitration contract under the Saving 
Clause are necessary but not sufficient to avoid preemption. 
Irrespective of whether the Discover Bank rule actually satisfied 
these prerequisites, the FAA preempted the Discover Bank rule, the 
Court held, because the rule stood "as an obstacle to the accomplish-
ment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."41 
Chief among those objectives "is to ensure the enforcement of arbitra-
tion agi·eements according to their terms so as to facilitate stream-
lined proceedings."42 The Discover Bank rule was inconsistent with 
this objective, the Court concluded, in that it required the availability 
of classwide arbitration.4 3 
The Court made clear that it viewed the Discover Bank rule as a 
categorical rule - as effectively requiring the availability of class ac-
tions - even though the California Supreme Court had cast its rule 
as a multi-factor test: the Court considered each of the three ele-
ments of the Discover Bank test and concluded that "any'' consumer 
claim would meet the test.44 AB for the first element - that "the 
waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion" - the Court 
noted that, "the times in which consumer contracts were anything 
other than adhesive are long past."45 That is, virtually all consumer 
contracts today are adhesive. AB for the second requirement - that 
38. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
39. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 17 46--48. 
40. Id. at 1750-53. 
41. Id. at 1753. 
42. Id. at 1748; see also id. at 1749 (quoting Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 
357-58 (2008)). 
43. Id. at 1748, 1750-51. 
44. Id. at 1750. 
45. Id. 
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the waiver is found "in a setting in which disputes between the con-
tracting parties predictably involve small amounts of damages" -
the Court concluded that this requirement "is toothless and mallea-
ble" and cited a Ninth Circuit holding that damages of $4000 were 
sufficiently small to satisfy the test.46 Finally, as for the third prereq-
uisite - that "it is alleged that the party with the superior bargain-
ing power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large 
numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money" -
the Court reasoned that this limitation was no limitation at all "as all 
that is required is an allegation."47 
The Court went on to explain in detail how requiring the availa-
bility of classwide arbitration was inconsistent with the fundamental 
attributes of arbitration. First, class arbitration involves absent par-
ties and, thus, necessitates greater procedural formality. 4s For exam-
ple, in a class arbitration, the arbitrator must decide whether to 
certify the class, whether the named parties are sufficiently represen-
tative and typical to qualify as class representatives, and how discov-
ery should be conducted on behalf of the class. The absent class 
members must be given notice, an opportunity to be heard, and the 
right to opt out. These procedures, the Court concluded, make "the 
[arbitration] process slower, more costly, and more likely to generate 
procedural morass than final judgment."49 
Second, class arbitration involves higher stakes for tbe respon-
dent: "when damages allegedly owed to tens of thousands of potential 
claimants are aggregated and decided at once, the risk of an error 
will often become unacceptable" to the respondent in light of the only 
limited judicial review that might follow an arbitration. 50 "Faced 
with even a small chance of a devastating loss," the Court reasoned, 
respondents "will be pressured into settling questionable claims."51 
Thus, the Court concluded, "It is not reasonably deniable that 
requiring consumer disputes to be arbitrated on a classwide basis 
will have a substantial deterrent effect on incentives to arbitrate."52 
Because Discover Bank required companies either to allow class arbi-
tration or to forego arbitration altogether and because class arbitra-
tion is so undesirable from the companies' perspective, Discover Bank 
46. Id. at 1746, 1750. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 1751. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 1752. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 1752 n.8. 
14 Harvard Negotiation Law Review [Vol. 20:1 
in practice presented companies with only one real option - to forego 
arbitration. Thus, the Discover Bank rule impermissibly disadvan-
taged arbitration. 
It bears emphasis that the Court was utterly indifferent to Cali-
fornia's claimed need for the Discover Bank rule. The Court rejected 
the argument that "class proceedings are necessary to prosecute 
small-dollar claims that might otherwise slip through the legal sys-
tem."53 In response to this argument, the Court made clear that 
"States cannot require a procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA, 
even if it is desirable for unrelated reasons."54 
In sum, Concepcion severely limits a state's authority to invali-
date an arbitration contract "upon such grounds as exist at law or in 
equity for the revocation of any contract." Of critical importance to 
the focus of this Article, Concepcion does so in a manner that calls 
into question the very existence of the state effective-vindication ex-
ception, upon which much state employment arbitration regulation is 
grounded. In Part II, therefore, this Article explicates the state effec-
tive-vindication exception and considers the implications of Concep-
cion and Italian Colors Restaurant for the exception's survival. 
III. THE FEDERAL AND STATE EFFECTIVE-V1NDIDCAT10N ExcEPrIONS 
AFTER AT&T MOBILITY LLC v. CONCEPCION AND 
AMERICAN EXPRESS Co. V. ITALIAN COLORS RESTAURANT 
A. The State Effective-Vindication Exception Defined 
For the purpose of understanding the state effective-vindication 
exception and also for the purpose of defining the scope of this Arti-
cle, it is useful first to distinguish the state effective-vindication ex-
ception from the unconscionability defense at issue in Concepcion. 
The two defenses to arbitration contract enforcement share similari-
ties and frequently overlap.55 Yet they differ significantly in their fo-
cus. As noted earlier, the state effective-vindication exception is a 
species of public policy defense. The California Supreme Court itself 
53. Id. at 1753. 
54. Id.; accord Marmet Health Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1203--04 
(2012) (holding that the FAA preempts West Virginia case law itself holding that a 
predispute arbitration clause contained in a nursing home contract and relating to a 
personal-injury or wrongful-death negligence claim was void "as a matter of public 
policy under West Virginia law"). 
55. See, e.g., Chavarria v. Ralph's Grocery Co., 733 F.3d 916, 926-27 (9th Cir. 
2013) (holding that a certain arbitration agreement was unconscionable under Cali-
fornia law and discussing in support of that holding the U.S. Supreme Court's most 
recent effective-vindication exception case); In re Poly·America, L.P., Ind., 262 
S.W.3d. 337, 353, 360--01 (Tex. 2008) (holding provisions of an arbitration agreement 
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has noted the important distinction between the public-policy-based 
effective-vindication exception and the unconscionability defense and 
has explained the difference this way: 
A public policy defense is concerned with the relationship of the 
contract to society as a whole, and targets contractual provi-
sions that undermine a clear public policy, such as an unwaiv-
able statutory right designed to accomplish a public purpose. 
Unconscionability is concerned with the relationship between 
the contracting parties and one-sided terms such that consent in 
any real sense appears to be lacking.56 
This Article is not principally concerned per se with the contrac-
tual or statutory employment rights of individual employees. Rather, 
the primary focus of this Article is on the ability of a state to imple-
ment employment arbitration regulation so as to promote the public 
purposes and safeguard the public interests of society as a whole that 
ground that state's employment regulation. Thus, the problem that 
the Article demonstrates below is that the FAA, as the U.S. Supreme 
Court most recently has interpreted it, obliterates the state effective-
vindication exception to arbitration contract enforcement. In doing 
so, the FAA undermines the ability of a state through employment 
arbitration regulation to promote the public purposes and safeguard 
the public interests that ground that state's regulation of the employ-
ment relationship. Accordingly, the solution that the Article proposes 
moves the public purposes and public interests that ground employ-
ment regulation back to the center of the analysis of FAA preemption 
of state employment arbitration regulation. 
To better understand the state effective-vindication exception, it 
is useful to become familiar with the exception's relatively more se-
curely-grounded cousin - the effective vindication of federal statu-
tory rights exception (hereinafter federal effective-vindication 
exception). In particular, to more fully appreciate this Article's argu-
ment that the state effective-vindication exception does not exist, it is 
helpful to consider how the state effective-vindication exception dif-
fers from the federal effective-vindication exception in both its gene-
sis and its scope. As the U.S. Supreme Court most recently described 
the rule in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, the 
federal effective-vindication exception would invalidate an arbitra-
tion contract provision that purports to waive prospectively a party's 
that would inhibit effective vindication of an employee's retaliatory discharge claim 
"invalid, as substantively unconscionable and void"). 
56. Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 247 P.3d 130, 146 (Cal. 2011), vacated, 
132 S. Ct. 496 (2011) (internal citations omitted). 
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right to pursue a federal statutory remedy.57 Thus, the exception 
would invalidate an arbitration contract provision that required an 
employee to bring any claims against her employer arising from her 
employment in arbitration but then, for example, also precluded the 
employee from asserting any claims arising under the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act ("ADEA").58 The exception also arguably 
would invalidate an arbitration contract provision that required the 
employee to bring her ADEA claims in arbitration but then, for exam-
ple, also provided for administrative and filing fees relating to the 
arbitration that were so high that access to the arbitral forum for the 
employee was impracticable.59 
The federal effective-vindication exception is, at its root, an in-
quiry into Congressional intent. Congress has the power to exempt 
claims arising under any statute from the FAA's scope.60 The U.S. 
Supreme Court will look in three places for such a Congressional in-
tent to exempt: (1) in the express text of the statute; (2) in the legisla-
tive history of the statute; and (3) in an "inherent conflict" between 
arbitration and the effective vindication of rights arising under the 
statute,61 In the case of an inherent conflict, Congressional intent to 
exempt claims arising under a statute from the scope of the FAA is 
implied. The federal effective-vindication exception derives from this 
express or implied Congressional intent. 
The theory that grounds the federal effective-vindication excep-
tion cannot logically be applied without modification in the context of 
a state statute.62 A state legislature generally does not have the 
57. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310 (2013); cf Mit-
subishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985) (sug-
gesting that "so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindica.te its statutory 
cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute [at issue] will continue to serve both 
its remedial and deterrent function"). 
58. See Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. at 2310. 
59. See id. at 2310-11, cf. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 
(suggesting that, "It may well be that the existence of large arbitration costs could 
preclude a litigant ... from effectively vindicating her federal statutory rights in the 
arbitral forum"). 
60. CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669 (2012); Mitsubishi Mo-
tors Corp., 473 U.S. at 627-28. 
61. Shearson/Am. Exptess, Inc. v. McMallon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987). 
62. See Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans, 988 P.2d 67, 86 (Cal. 1999) (Chin, J., 
concurring and dissenting) (arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court's FAA jurispru-
dence teaches "that the legal principles governing the scope and exercise of Congress's 
authority to establish exceptions to the FAA may not serve as the basis for reading 
into the FAA an exception for state laws that limit enforcement of arbitration agree-
ments") (emphasis in the original); Yelnosky, supra note 26, at 752 (concluding that 
"while Congress can create a federal right and guarantee judicial enforcement tegard-
less of the terms of a written arbitration agreement, the Court's interpretation of the 
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power to enact exceptions to federal law.63 Thus, arguably it is non-
sensical to ask whether an inherent conflict between arbitration and 
the effective vindication of rights arising under a state statute evi-
dences a state legislature's intent to exempt claims arising under the 
state statute from the scope of the FAA.64 The state effective-vindica-
tion exception, if it exists at all, must be grounded in a theory apart 
from the precise theory that grounds the effective-vindication excep-
tion in the context of a federal statute. 
One such theory is that Congress, in enacting the FAA, intended 
to accord some respect to a state's decision to preclude waiver of a 
judicial forum where such preclusion is grounded in an important 
state policy.65 A version of this theory holds that the state effective-
vindication exception is a ground "for the revocation of any contract" 
within the purview of section 2's Saving Clause.66 Absent a federal 
limitation, a state may refuse, typically on public policy grounds, to 
enforce a contract that purports to waive an unwaivable statutory 
right. Proponents of a state effective-vindication exception would ar-
gue, therefore, that a state may refuse to enforce even an arbitration 
contract that waives an unwaivable statutory right or that has the 
effect of waiving an unwaivable statutory right. Indeed, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court has expressly invoked this "revocation of any con-
tract" theory to justify its application of the state effective-vindication 
exception so as to impose limits on predispute employment arbitra-
tion contracts. 67 
FAA prevents a state legislature from doing the same thing with respect to a state-
created right"). 
63. Vallev. Lowe's HIW, Inc., No. 11-1489 SC, 2011 WL 3667441, at *6 (N.D. Cal. 
Aug. 22, 2011) (stating that "states may not exempt claims from the FAA"). 
64. See Yelnosky, supra note 26, at 767--08, n.192 (noting that "a similar inquiry, 
determining whether the state legislature that created a state-law cause of action 
intended to guarantee a judicial forum for resolution of claims, is prohibited under the 
Coures FAA jurisprudence"). 
65. See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 494--95 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that "California's policy choice to preclude waivers of a judicial forum for 
wage claims is entitled to respect"). 
66. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 17-21 (1984) (St.,vens, J., concur· 
ring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the judiciary must fashion grounds 
for revocation under section 2's Saving Clause as a matter of federal common law and 
that a state's judgment that a type of arbitration contract is invalid as contrary to 
public policy may be entitled to respect). But cf Yelnosky, supra note 26, at 748 (not· 
ing that Justice Stevens's argument that the Saving Clause authorized federal courts 
to create federal common law relating to the enforcement of arbitration agreements 
"never gained any traction"). 
67. See Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc., 63 P.3d 979, 988-S9 (Cal. 2003) (explaining 
the theory grounding the Armendariz doctrine). 
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The U.S. Supreme Court has never recognized that a state effec-
tive-vindication exception exists. In fact, the Court's FAA preemption 
jurisprudence strongly implies that such an exception does not ex-
ist. ss Further, the reasoning grounding the Court's decisions in Con-
cepcion and in Italian Colors Restaurant clearly suggests that even if 
such an exception does exist, the exception does not exist in the 
strong form that grounds California's employment arbitration 
doctrine. 
B. The Effect of Concepcion and Italian Colors Restaurant on the 
State Effective-Vindication Exception 
Concepcion was not an effective-vindication case. Nonetheless, 
Concepcion makes clear that if application of the state effective-vindi-
cation exception frustrates the purposes of the FAA, the exception 
must give way to the FAA regardless of the state policy at issue. As 
discussed in Part I, the Court in Concepcion held that "States cannot 
require a procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is 
desirable for unrelated reasons" and, thus, it was irrelevant to FAA 
preemption that "class proceedings are necessary to prosecute small-
dollar claims that might otherwise slip through the legal system."69 
The California Supreme Court has theorized that the state effective-
vindication exception derives from section 2's Saving Clause and 
merely utilizes public policy as a ground "for the revocation of any 
contract."7° Concepcion teaches that a state's regulation of an arbi-
tration contract pursuant to section 2 is subject to each of the funda-
mental principles of FAA preemption. One of those fundamental 
principles is that the importance of a state policy is irrelevant to FAA 
preemption analysis. Thus, to the extent that the state effective-vin-
dication exception is grounded in the theory that violation of state 
public policy is a ground "for the revocation of any contract," Concep-
cion obliterates the exception. 
68. See Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 16 n.11 (labeling "unpersuasive" the anal-
ogy between Congress enacting an exception to section 2 of the FAA and a state legis-
lature doing so); Ferguson v. Corinthian Coils., Inc., 733 F.3d 928, 935-36 (9th Cir. 
2013) (discussing the dissent in Italian Colors Restaurant and concluding that "[t)he 
'effective vindication' exception, which permits the invalidation of an arbitration 
agreement when arbitration would prevent the 'effective vindication' of a federal stat-
ute, does not extend to state statutes"). But cf. Yelnosky, supra note 26, at 765-70 
(asserting prior to Italian Colors Restaurant that whether the state effective-vindica-
tion exception exists is an "apparently open and important question" and discussing 
at length possible bases for its existence). 
69. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011). 
70. See Little, 63 P.3d at 988-89. 
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Independent of Concepcion, Italian Colors Restaurant calls into 
question the existence of the state effective-vindication exception and 
suggests that the exception cannot save state employment arbitra-
tion regulation grounded in the doctrine. Interestingly, Italian Colors 
Restaurant did not involve a state statutory right. Indeed, Italian 
Colors Restaurant did not involve FAA preemption at all. Nonethe-
less, the case forebodes ill health for the state effective-vindication 
exception generally and for state public-policy-based employment ar-
bitration doctrine specifically. 
In Italian Colors Restaurant, the respondents argued that the 
federal effective-vindication exception precluded enforcement of their 
arbitration contract given that the contract contained a contractual 
waiver of class arbitration and given that the cost of any individual 
respondent individually a1-bitrating the federal antitrust claims at is-
sue would greatly exceed the potential recovery for such individual 
claims.n Thus, the respondents argued, "[e]nforcing the waiver of 
class arbitration bars effective vindication [of their rights under the 
federal antitrust statute] because they have no economic incentive to 
pursue their antitrust claims individually in arbitration."72 
The Court rejected the respondents' argument in such a way as 
to make clear that the federal effective-vindication exception is quite 
narrow. The Court reasoned that, "the fact that it is not worth the 
expense involved in proving a statutory remedy does not constitute 
the elimination of the right to pursue that remedy."73 Thus, where 
the arbitration contract allows the claimant to bring a claim in an 
arbitral forum and where administrative and filing fees arising from 
the arbitration are not so grnat as to effectively eliminate the claim-
ant's access to the arbitral forum, the federal effective-vindication ex-
ception will not invalidate the arbitration contract even if a class 
arbitration waiver renders the successful prosecution of that claim in 
arbitration economically impracticable. The Court also made clear 
that it was fully aware of the consequences of its narrow interpreta-
tion of the federal effective-vindication exception: the Court cited 
Concepcion for the proposition that "the FAA's command to enforce 
arbitration agreements trumps any interest in ensuring the prosecu-
tion of low-value claims."74 
71. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2308, 2310 (2013). 
72. Id. at 2310. 
73. Id. at 2311. 
74. Id. at 2312 n.5. 
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As more fully developed in Part III of this Article, the majority 
opinion in Italian Colors Restaurant has dire consequences for em-
ployment arbitration doctrine grounded in the state effective-vindica-
tion exception. Arguably even more problematic, however, are the 
implications for such employment arbitration doctrine arising from 
Justice Kagan's dissent in Italian Colors Restaurant. In her dissent, 
which Justices Ginsburg and Breyer joined,75 Justice Kagan argued 
for a broader federal effective-vindication exception pursuant to 
which "[a]n arbitration clause will not be enforced if it prevents the 
effective vindication of federal statutory rights, however [the arbitra-
tion clause] achieves that result.76 Importantly, however, Justice Ka-
gan argued that proof that arbitration was merely a "less convenient 
or less effective" means of vindication as contrasted with proceeding 
in court should not suffice to "meet the effective-vindication rule's 
high bar. "77 
Moreover, and most importantly, in seeking to minimize the im-
portance of Concepcion's holding to the case at hand, Justice Kagan 
made clear the dissenters' view that the state effective-vindication ex-
ception simply does not exist: 
When a state rule allegedly conflicts with the FAA, we apply 
standard preemption principles, asking whether the state law frus-
trates the FAA's purposes and objectives. If the state rule does so -
as the Court found in [Concepcion] - the Supremacy Clause requires 
its invalidation. We have no earthly interest (quite the contrary) in 
vindicating that law. Our effective-vindication rule comes into play 
only when the FAA is alleged to conflict with another federal law, like 
the Sherman Act here. In that all-federal context, one law does not 
automatically bow to the other, and the effective-vindication rule 
serves as a way to reconcile any tension between them."78 
Given the view of Justices Kagan, Ginsberg, and Breyer that the 
effective-vindication exception does not apply to state statutory rights 
at all, it is difficult to imagine how five votes in support of the state 
effective-vindication exception might be found on the current Court. 
Indeed, this author would predict with great confidence that the cur-
rent Court would hold that the state effective-vindication exception 
simply does not exist. 
To appreciate more fully the impact of Italian Colors Restaurant 
in conjunction with Concepcion on public-policy-based employment 
75. Justice Sotomayor did not pa1·ticipate in the Italian Colors Restaurant case. 
76. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. at 2314 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
77. Id. at 2318 n.4 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
78. Id. at 2320 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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arbitration doctrine, it is useful to consider concrete examples. Thus, 
in Part III, this Article focuses on California's four principal employ-
ment arbitration doctrines. As noted earlier and as more fully-devel-
oped below, each of these doctrines ultimately derives from the 
effective vindication of unwaivable state statutory rights exception to 
the FAA's application. 
IV. AN AUTOPSY OF STATE EMPLOYMENT MBITRATION DOCTRINE: 
THE CALIFORNIA EXN"1PLE 
The California Supreme Court has created four principal employ· 
ment arbitration doctrines. These doctrines, in the order of their pro· 
mulgation, are (1) the Armendariz doctrine; (2) the Gentry doctrine; 
(3) the unwaivability doctrine respecting the right to a Berman hear· 
ing; and ( 4) the unwaivability doctrine respecting representative Pri-
vate Attorneys General Act of 2004 ("PAGA") actions. This Part 
considers each of these doctrines in turn and explains how each of 
these doctrines fails FAA preemption analysis. This discussion uses 
the example of California law to make two points of relevance nation-
wide. First, this discussion demonstrates the extent to which some 
courts have aggressively sought to use employment arbitration doc-
trine to safeguard the public policies that ground more general state 
regulation of the employment relationship. Second, the discussion 
also demonstrates the extent to which Concepcion and Italian Colors 
Restaurant will preclude any state court or legislature from success-
fully doing so in the future. These two points inform the reform pro-
posal in Part IV. 
This Part proceeds along two tracks. First, consistent with the 
discussion above of Concepcion and the dissent in Italian Colors Res-
taurant, this Part assumes that the state effective-vindication excep-
tion does not exist. In such a case, the FAA preemption analysis 
becomes quite simple with respect to each of the principal California 
employment arbitration doctrines - each of which is grounded on the 
exception: each must "automatically bow to" the FAA. Thus, the FAA 
preempts the doctrine to the extent that the doctrine conflicts with 
the FAA. Second, recognizing that the particular issue of the exis-
tence of the state effective-vindication exception was not before the 
Court in either Concepcion or Italian Colors Restaurant, this Part as-
sumes for the sake of argument that a state effective-vindication ex-
ception does exist and is co-extensive with the federal effective-
vindication exception as outlined in the majority opinion in Italian 
Colors Restaurant. Pursuant to this track, the Article considers 
22 Harvard Negotiation Law Review [Vol. 20:1 
whether the state effective-vindication exception protects the Califor-
nia employment arbitrntion doctrine at issue from FAA preemption. 
A. The Armendariz Doctrine 
1. The Rule and Its Rationale 
In Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc., the 
California Supreme Court held that whenever an arbitration agree-
ment that an employer has required as a condition of employment 
obligates an employee to bring in arbitration a claim arising under an 
unwaivable statutory right, such as a Fair Employment and Housing 
Act ("FEHA") claim, the arbitration agreement must allow the claim-
ant to vindicate her statutory rights.79 Accordingly, the court held, 
the agreement must guarantee certain minimum procedural protec-
tions: (1) a neutral arbitrator;80 (2) allowance of all types of relief that 
normally would be available under the statute;81 (3) discovery suffi-
cient to arbitrate the claimant's statutory claim, "including access to 
essential documents and witnesses";B2 (4) a written decision and judi-
cial review sufficient to ensure that arbitrators comply with the re-
quirements of the statute - thus, a written opinion that sets out "the 
essential findings and conclusions on which the award is based";83 
and (5) limitations on the costs of arbitration - specifically, "the ar-
bitration agreement or arbitration process cannot generally require 
the employee to bear any type of expense that the employee would not 
be required to bear if he or she were free to bring the action in 
court."84 
The Armendariz court grounded its reasoning on the state effec-
tive-vindication exception. The court first concluded that that an em-
ployee may not prospectively waive her rights under the FEHA given 
that the rights the FEHA established are "for a public reason" -
namely to promote the public interest in a workplace free of perni-
cious discrimination.85 Any such contract waiving the rights FEHA 
established, the court argued, "would be contrary to public policy and 
79. Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 674 (Cal. 
2000); see also Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc., 63 P.3d 979, 987-89 (Cal. 2003) (extending 
the Armendariz doctrine to employee claims for wrongful termination in violation of 
public policy). 
80. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 682. 
81. Id. at 682-83. 
82. Id. at 683-84. 
83. Id. at 684-85. 
84. Id. at 685-89. 
85. Id. at 680. 
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unlawful."B6 The court further concluded that what an employer can-
not do directly - namely, require an employee to waive her FERA 
rights - it cannot do indirectly by means of an arbitration agree-
ment: "In light of these principles, it is evident that an arbitration 
agreement cannot be made to serve as a vehicle for the waiver of stat-
utory rights created by the FEHA."B7 Finally, the court concluded 
that absent the procedural safeguards it had set out, arbitration 
would be used to force claimants to forfeit their unwaivable statutory 
employment rights in violation of public policy.BB 
2. The Preemption Analysis 
a. Track 1: The State Effective-Vindication Exception Does Not 
Exist 
Two of the five Armendariz requirements should withstand a 
post-Concepcion post-Italian Colors Restaurant preemption challenge 
because they do not interfere with the fundamental attributes of arbi-
trntion. Requiring a neutral arbitrator is fully consistent with the es-
sence of arbitration. Moreover, requiring that the arbitrator have the 
authority to grant all types of relief available under the statute that 
gives rise to the claim in no way disadvantages arbitration.B9 
Each of the remaining Armendariz factors, however, stands, in 
the language of Concepcion, as an obstacle to "the enforcement of ar-
bitration agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate 
streamlined proceedings."90 The FAA, therefore, preempts each of 
these Armendariz factors. 91 Concepcion's discussion of examples of 
86. Id. at 681. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. at 681~9. The court in Armemkriz also held that with respect to any 
claim subject to an arbitration agreement required as a condition of employment -
not just c1aims relating to unwaivable statutory rights - it \vould be unconscionable 
for an employer to require the employee to arbitrate claims arising out of a series of 
transactions or occurrences while exempting itself from arbitrating its claims arising 
out of the same series of transactions or occurrences. Id. at 693-94. 
89. But see Stipanowich, supra note 1, at 385~6 (expressing concern that Con-
cepcionJs efficiency rationale might prevent a court from finding an arbitration provi-
sion denying remedies such as punitive damages to be unconscionable). 
90. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011). 
91. See Hwang v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. CV 11-10782 PSG (JEMx), 
2012 WL 3862338, at *3 n.3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2012) (stating in dicta in reference to 
Armendariz that "[w]hether California public policy may invalidate certain sections of 
arbitration agreements is questionable in light of Concepcion"); Antonelli v. Finish 
Line, Inc., No. 5:11-cv-03874 EJD, 2012 WL 2499930, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 27, 2012) 
(stating that if Armendariz requires certain minimum procedural protections for an 
24 Harvard Negotiation Law Review [Vol. 20:1 
impermissible uses of the public policy and unconscionability doc-
trines bolsters this conclusion: the Court cited as one such impermis-
sible use "a case finding unconscionable or unenforceable as against 
public policy consumer arbitration agreements that fail to provide for 
judicially monitored discovery."92 
Granted, there is a significant difference between requiring "ju-
dicially monitored discovery" and failing to provide for "discovery suf-
ficient to arbitrate the claimant's statutory claim, including access to 
essential documents and witnesses." Still, the principal way in which 
arbitration has traditionally facilitated streamlined proceedings is by 
limiting discovery.93 Arbitration has also traditionally streamlined 
proceedings by not requiring a reasoned opinion and severely limiting 
judicial review. Armendariz increases the costs of employment arbi-
tration by requiring a certain level of discovery and a reasoned opin-
ion by the arbitrator. Armendariz then mandates that the employer 
bear any of these costs and any other costs that an employee incurs in 
arbitration that she would not have incurred had she litigated her 
claim against the employer in court. Thus, together and separately, 
each of these Armendariz requirements disadvantages arbitration.94 
b. Track 2: The State Effective-Vindication Exception Does 
Exist 
The state effective-vindication exception does not save these pro-
cedural requirements from FAA preemption. Although the absence of 
these Armendariz mandates arguably would make arbitration a less 
convenient or Jess effective means for an employee to vindicate her 
statutory rights, their absence does not eliminate the employee's 
right to pursue relief. Indeed, a claimant denied Armendariz-man-
dated discovery would still have the right under section 7 of the FAA 
to demand the production of witnesses and documents at the arbitra-
tion hearing.95 Also, a claimant denied an Armendariz-mandated rea-
soned arbitrator opinion would still have the right to appeal the 
employment arbitration arising from an arbitration agreement required as a condi-
tion of employment and relating to an unwaivable statutory right, "such a require-
ment would appear to be preempted by the FAA under the Supreme Court's reasoning 
in Concepcion"). 
92. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 17 4 7. 
93. See Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 684 n.11 (acknowledging "a limitation on discovery 
is one important component of the 'simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitra-
tion"') (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991)). 
94. Cf. Lucas v. Hertz Corp., 875 F. Supp. 2d 991, 1007 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (reason-
ing that Concepcion "suggests that limitations on arbitral discovery no longer support 
a finding of substantive unconscionability"). 
95. See 9 U.S.C § 7 (1947). 
Spring 2015] FAA Preemption of State Employment Arb 25 
arbitration award on the limited grounds provided in sections 9 and 
10 of the FAA or comparable state law.96 And while the effective-vin-
dication exception "would perhaps cover filing and administrative 
fees attached to arbitration that are so high as to make access to the 
[arbitral) forum impracticable,"97 Italian Colors Restaurant makes 
clear that the doctrine cannot be stretched to allow a state to pre-
clude the assessment of any type of arbitration fee against an em-
ployee/claimant regardless of whether the fee would make access to 
the arbitral forum impractical. 
B. The Gentry Doctrine 
1. The Rule and Its Rationale 
In Gentry v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court held 
that in a case asserting an unwaivable statutory right, such as the 
right to overtime pay under the California Labor Code, class arbitra-
tion waivers should not be enforced if a trial court determines, based 
upon certain specified factors, "that class arbitration would be a sig-
nificantly more effective way of vindicating the rights of affected em-
ployees than individual arbitration."98 The factors that the Gentry 
court specified are (1) "the modest size of the potential individual re-
covery, [(2)] the potential for retaliation against members of the class, 
[(3)] the fact that absent members of the class may be ill informed 
about their rights, and [(4)] other real world obstacles to the vindica-
tion of class members' right to overtime pay through individual arbi-
tration."99 Unlike the typical formulation of the state effective-
vindication exception, the Gentry Doctrine does not require a finding 
that the claimant would find it impractical to vindicate the statutory 
right at issue in arbitration. Rather, the Gentry Doctrine requires 
only that arbitration would be a significantly less effective forum for 
vindicating the statutory right. Moreover, the court made clear that 
the Gentry Doctrine would apply not only when the claimant herself 
would find individual arbitration less effective but also when any 
members of the purported class would find arbitration to be so.100 
The California Supreme Court grounded its holding in Gentry in 
part on the reasoning of Discover Bank, which the court discussed at 
length in the Gentry opinion.1°1 The focus of the opinion and of the 
96. See 9 U.S.C §§ 9-10 (1947). 
97. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310-11 (2013). 
98. Gentry v. Superior Court, 165 P.3d 556, 559 (2007). 
99. Id. at 568. 
100. Id. at 568 n.7. 
101. Id. at 560--02, 564. 
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Gentry doctrine, however, is on unwaivable statutory rights, as op-
posed to unconscionability. 1 0 2 The court's reasoning started with the 
proposition that the rights at issue in Gentry - specifically the right 
to overtime compensation pursuant to section 510 of the California 
Labor Code and the right to bring a private cause of action to recover 
overtime wages pursuant to section 1194 of the California Labor 
Code - are unwaivable. 1oa The court noted that the rights at issue 
concern not only the interests of the workers themselves "but also the 
public health and general welfare."104 For example, overtime wages 
foster society's interest in a stable job market by giving employers an 
incentive to spread employment throughout the work force. Finally, 
the court concluded that "under some circumstances" a class arbitra-
tion waiver would lead to a de facto waiver of statutory rights. 10s In 
those circumstances, the court held, public policy dictates that such a 
class arbitration waiver may not be enforced. 106 
2. The Preemption Analysis 
a. Track 1: The State Effective-Vindication Exception Does Not 
Exist 
Broadly speaking, Gentry does exactly what the U.S. Supreme 
Court said in Concepcion that a state may not do: recall that the 
Court framed the issue in Concepcion as "whether the FAA prohibits 
States from conditioning the enforceability of certain arbitration 
agreements on the availability of classwide arbitration proce-
dures."107 The Court answered that question in the affirmative, con-
cluding that "[r]equiring the availability of classwide arbitration 
interferes with the fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus 
creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA."108 Thus, Gentry, no less 
102. See Kinecta Alternative Fin. Solutions, Inc. v. Superior Court, 140 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 347, 355 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) ("In contrast to the unconscionability analysis in 
Discover Bank, the rule in Gentry concerns the effects of a class action \Vaiver on 
unwaivable statutory rights regardless of unconscionability") (internal quotations 
omitted); Plows v. Rockwell Collins, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1069 (C.D. Cal, 2011) 
(same); Arguelles-Romero v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. Rptr. 3d 289, 300-02 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2010) (same). 
103. Gentry, 165 P.3d at 562-63. 
104. Id. at 563. 
105, Id. at 563-64. 
106. Id. at 569. 
107. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011). 
108. Id. at 1748. 
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th.an Discover Bank, stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of. 
the FAA's objectives.109 
The leading case holding that Concepcion does not preempt Gen-
try is Franco v. Arakelian Enterprises, lnc. 110 In Franco, the Califor-
nia Court of Appeal for the Second District thought it critical to the 
U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Concepcion that Discover Bank es-
tablished a categorical prohibition on class action waivers in con-
sumer contracts in that Discover Bank's triggering conditions 
imposed no effective limit on the rule's application because the condi-
tions could be met in nearly every case. 111 In short, Franco held that 
"Gentry is not preempted by the FAA because it is not a categorical 
rule that invalidates class action waivers - the type of rule that Con-
cepcion condemned."112 
109. See Andrade v. P.F. Chang's China Bistro, No. 12CV2724 JLS JMA, 2013 WL 
5472589, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2013) (commenting that "the Court cannot recognize 
any distinction between Discover Bank and Gentry that would preserve Gentry's ap-
plicability in light of Concepcion"); Fimby-Christensen v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc., 
No. 5:13-cv-01007-EJD, 2013 WL 6158040, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2013) (reason-
ing that, although Concepcion did not expressly overrule Gentry, Concepcion effec-
tively overruled Gentry); Velazquez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 13cv680-WQH-DHB, 
2013 WL 4525581, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2013) (holding that "[i]n light of Concep-
cion, ... Gentry is not a viable basis for invalidating the [class action waiver in an 
employment arbitration] Agreement" (quoting Jasso v. Money Mart Express, Inc., 879 
F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1049 (N.D. Cal. 2012))); Cunningham v. Leslie's Poolmart, Inc., No. 
CV 13-2122 CAS (CWx), 2013 WL 3233211, at *4 (C.D. Cal. June 25, 2013) (agreeing 
"that the rule in Gentry is analogous to the Discover Bank rule, and therefore is pre-
empted under Concepcion"); Truly Nolen of Am. v. Superior Court, 145 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
432, 445-46 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (noting that Discover Bank's "discredited reasoning 
is the same rationale employed by the Gentry court" and, thus, "Concepcion implicitly 
disapproved the reasoning of the Gentry court"); Jskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Ange-
les, LLC, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 372, 379 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012), review granted and opinion 
superseded by 286 P.3d 147 (Cal. Sep. 19, 2012) (holding that Concepcion "conclu-
sively invalidates the Gentry test"); Sanders v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona, LLC, 843 
F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (Concepcion effectively overrules Gentry be-
cause Gentry "stand[s] as an obstacle to enforcement of arbitration agreements gov-
erned by the FAA"); Steele v. Am. Mortgage Mgmt. Servs., No. 2:12-cv-00085 WBS 
JFM, 2012 WL 5349511, at *4 n.1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2012) (rejecting an argument 
based on Gentry because Concepcion overruled Gentry); Valle v. Lowe's HIW, Inc., No. 
11-1489 SC, 2011 WL 3667441, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2011) (noting that Gentry 
relied upon the same precedent and logic as Discover Bank and concluding that "in 
light of Concepcion, Gentry is no longer good law"). 
110. Franco v. Arakelian Enters., Inc., 149 Cal. Rptr. 3d 530 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012), 
review granted and opinion superseded by 294 P.3d 74 (Cal. Feb. 13, 2013). 
111. Id. at 533, 565-67. 
112. Id. at 568; see also id. at 572 (reasoning that, "As required by Concepcion, 
Gentry is not a categorical rule against class action waivers but is a multifactor test). 
But cf. Lewis v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., 818 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1167 (N.D. Cal. 2011) 
(holding that "Concepcion effectively overrules Gentry" because "[l]ike Discover Bank, 
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It is far from clear, however, that Concepcion would have come 
out any differently had Discover Bank not been a categorical rule. 
Concepcion's reasoning supports the argument that the FAA 
preempts a state doctrine that is applied in any given case to require 
arbitration to have features that are inconsistent with the parties' 
agreement and with the nature of arbitration. Indeed, the California 
Supreme Court has recently interpreted Concepcion to have precisely 
this meaning. 113 
Moreover, the Gentry factors - whether or not they compose a 
categorical rule - frame an inquiry into whether enforcement of the 
arbitration agreement at issue as written would impair California's 
interest in ensuring the effective vindication of an unwaivable statu-
tory right. Concepcion makes clear, however, that California's inter-
ests are irrelevant to FAA preemption analysis. The critical issue 
instead is whether application of the Gentry doctrine in a given case 
interferes with the fundamental attributes of arbitration. The Gentry 
factors - whether or not they compose a categorical rule - do not 
speak at all to that issue. The supposed non-categorical nature of the 
Gentry factors, therefore, cannot provide a sensible basis for distin-
guishing Gentry from Discover Bank. Thus, the FAA would preempt 
Gentry in any case in which Gentry would be applied to invalidate a 
class action waiver, even if Gentry does not categorically invalidate 
class action waivers. 
In any event, Gentry's triggering conditions impose no more ef-
fective a limit on the Gentry rule's application than did Discover 
Bank's triggering conditions with respect to the Discover Bank rule's 
application.114 Gentry's first factor - the modest size of the potential 
individual recovery - is the same Discover Bank factor that the U.S. 
Gentry advances a rule of enforcement that applies specifically to arbitration provi-
sions, as opposed to a general rule of contract interpretation"). 
113. See Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 311 P.3d 184, 201 (Cal. 2013) (holding 
that "after Concepcion, unconscionability remains a valid defense to a petition to com-
pel arbitrationn but Concepcion clarifies that state unconscionability rules "must not 
disfavor arbitration as applied by imposing procedural requirements that interfere 
with fundamental attributes of arbitration") (internal quotations omitted); Iskanian 
v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC., 327 P.3d 129, 135-36 (Cal. 2014). 
114. See Reyes v. Liberman Broad., Inc., 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d 616, 622-25 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2012), reuiew granted and opinion superseded by 288 P.3d 1287 (Cal. Dec. 12, 
2012) (discussing the similarities between the Dmcouer Bank triggering conditions 
and those of Gentry); Jasso v. Money Ma1t Express, Inc., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1044 
(N.D. Cal. 2012) (noting the similarities between the Discover Bank triggering condi-
tions and those of Gentry and finding "no principled basis to distinguish between the 
Discover Bank rule and tbe rule in Gentry, given the broad language used by the 
Supreme Court in Concepcion"); Morvant v. P.F. Chang's China Bistro, Inc., 870 F. 
Supp. 2d 831, 840-41 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (same). 
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Supreme Court in Concepcion found to be "toothless and mallea-
ble. "115 Evidencing just how toothless and malleable this factor is, the 
court in Gentry cited approvingly a California Court of Appeal deci-
sion rejecting the argument that a $37,000 award would be ample 
incentive for an attorney to pursue an individual lawsuit for wage 
and hour violations. 116 With respect to Gentry's second factor - the 
potential for retaliation against members of the class - the Gentry 
court argued that, "Given that retaliation would cause immediate 
disruption of the employee's life and economic injury, and given that 
the outcome of the complaint process is uncertain, ... fear of retalia-
tion will often deter employees from individually suing their employ-
ers."117 Yet the potential for retaliation exists in every case where an 
employer or former employer might impose economic injury on the 
claimant. Even a former employee might fear a future negative refer-
ence from the employer she is suing. Thus, this factor could be found 
in almost any case. With respect to Gentry's third factor - the fact 
that absent members of the class may be ill informed about their 
rights - the court again set the bar low, noting that "even English 
speaking or better educated employees may not be aware of the nu-
ances of overtime laws with their sometimes complex classifications 
of exempt and non-exempt employees."118 Indeed, such nuances fre-
quently escape even sophisticated employers and employment law-
yers. If the test is an employee's lack of understanding of the nuances 
of American employment law, this factor as well could be found in 
almost any case. As for Gentry's fourth factor - the presence of other 
real world obstacles to the vindication of class members' right to over-
time pay through individual arbitration - the factor is sufficiently 
ambiguous such that it should pose no obstacle to the application of 
the Gentry doctrine in any case. 
b. Track 2: Th£ State Effective-Vindication Exception Does 
Exist 
The state effective-vindication exception, as cabined by Italian 
Colors Restaurant, does not save the Gentry Doctrine from FAA pre-
emption.119 The concern at the heart of Gentry is that class arbitra-
tion waivers eliminate the most practical means to bring claims that 
115. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 (2011). 
116. Gentry v. Superior Court, 165 P.3d 556, 564 (2007). 
117. Id. at 566. 
118. Id. at 567. 
119. See Cunningham v. Leslie's Poolmart, Inc., No. CV 13-2122 CAS (CWx), 2013 
WL 3233211, at *4-5 (C.D. Cal. June 25, 2013) (citing Italian Colors Restaurant in 
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otherwise would be too small to warrant individual arbitration or liti-
gation.120 Gentry is also concerned with other potential disincentives 
to bring claims - such as fear of retaliation and inadequate knowl-
edge of one's statutory rights. 121 Italian Colors Restaurant makes 
clear, however, that the effective-vindication exception is concerned 
with the right to pursue a remedy, but not with the incentive to pur-
sue a remedy and that the FAA is more concerned with enforcing ar-
bitration agreements .as written than with facilitating the 
prosecution oflow-value or otherwise unattractive claims.122 Finally, 
Justice Kagan's dissent suggests that the Court would look with 
great disfavor upon the Gentry Doctrine's application in cases in 
which arbitration is a practical but "significantly less effective" forum 
for vindication of a state statutory right. Recall Justice Kagan's ad-
monition that proof that arbitration was a "less convenient or less 
effective" means of vindication would fail to "meet the effective-vindi-
cation rule's high bar."12a 
Indeed, in June 2014, the California Supreme Court held in Is-
kanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC that, in light of Con-
cepcion, the FAA preempts the Gentry doctrine.124 The court first 
rejected the argument that the Gentry doctrine might meaningfully 
be distinguished from the Discover Bank rule because the latter but 
not the former is a categorical rule against class action waivers. "It 
is ... incorrect to say the infirmity of Discover Bank was that it did 
not require a case-specific showing that the class waiver was exculpa-
tory,'' the court reasoned. "Concepcion holds that even if a class 
waiver is exculpatory in a particular case, it is nonetheless pre-
empted by the FAA."125 The court went on to hold quite simply that, 
under the logic of Concepcion, the FAA preempts the Gentry doctrine 
rejecting the argument that Gentry remains good law under the effective-vindication 
exception); Andrade v. P.F. Chang's China Bistro, No. 12CV2724 JLS JMA, 2013 WL 
5472589, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2013) (concluding that Italian Colors Restaurant 
supports the argument that the FAA preempts Gentry). 
120. Gentry, 165 P.3d at 565. 
121. Id. at 565-67. 
122. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 (2013) (clarify-
ing that "the fact that it is not worth the expense involved in proving a statutory 
remedy does not constitute the elimination of the right to pursue that remedy''); id. at 
2312 n.5 (declaring that "the FAA's command to enforce arbitration agreements 
trumps any interest in ensuring the prosecution of lovJ-value claims"). 
123. Id. at 2318 n.4 (Kagan J., dissenting). 
124. Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC, 327 P.3d 129, 135-37 (2014). 
125. Id. at 364. 
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because the Gentry doctrine "mandat[es] or promot[es] procedures in-
compatible with arbitration."126 
C. The Unwaivability Doctrine Respecting the Right to a Berman 
Hearing 
1. The Rule and Its Rationale 
A worker with a California state claim for unpaid wages has two 
routes she can take to recovery. She can file an ordinary civil action 
against her employer for the wages. In the alternative, she can pur-
sue relief at an administrative hearing commonly referred to as a 
"Berman hearing" after the surname of its legislative sponsor.127 
The Berman route begins with a hearing before the Lahm· Com-
missioner. If the employee obtains an award at the Berman hearing, 
the employer may request de nova review in superior court. The 
Berman route contains several provisions designed to aid the em-
ployee and to deter frivolous employer appeals. First, the Lahm Com-
missioner will represent the employee in superior court if the 
employee is trying to uphold the Labor Commissioner's award and is 
unable to afford counsel. Second, to appeal, the employer must post 
an "undertaking'' in the full. amount of the award. Finally, an em-
ployer who is unsuccessful in the appeal must pay the employee's at-
torney's fees. The employer is "unsuccessful" if the employee receives 
more than zero after the appea1.12s 
In 2011, the California Supreme Court held in Sonic-Calabasas 
A, Inc. v. Moreno (hereinafter Sonic [) that an arbitration agreement 
that an employee enters into as a condition of employment that re-
quires the employee to bring her wage claims against the employer in 
arbitration and, therefore, to forego a Berman hearing, is both con-
trary to public policy and unconscionable.129 The court further held, 
however, that an employer who had entered into an arbitration 
agreement with its employee could bring an appeal of a Berman hear-
ing award in arbitration.1ao 
Notably, the court in Sonic I did not hold that the arbitration 
agreement was against public policy because it prevented vindication 
of the unwaivable statutory right to wages due. Rather, the court 
held that the unwaivable statutory right at issue was the right to a 
126. Id. at 366. 
127. Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 247 P.3d 130, 133, 135 (Cal. 2011), va-
cated, 132 S. Ct. 496 (2011). 
128. Id. at 133, 136-37. 
129. Id. at 139-46. 
130. Id. at 133, 137-39. 
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Berman hearing and its related protections and that it would violate 
public policy for an employer to compel an employee to relinquish 
that unwaivable right in favor of arbitration. 131 The court grounded 
this conclusion on its finding of the California legislature's implied 
intent. In short, the court reasoned that the legislature must have 
intended to prohibit employers from requiring employees as a condi-
tion of employment to waive their right to a Berman hearing since 
such waivers "would seriously undermine the efficacy of the Berman 
hearing statutes and hence thwart the public purpose behind the 
statutes" of ensuring that workers receive wages that are owed 
them.132 Thus, the court held that the arbitration agreement in Sonic 
I violated public policy because it waived the unwaivable statutory 
right to a Berman hearing.133 
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the decision in Sonic 
I and remanded to the California Supreme Court for further consider-
ation in light of Concepcion. 134 In June 2013, still not having issued 
an opinion on remand, the California Supreme Court called for fur-
ther briefing in light of Italian Colors Restaurant.135 
2. The Preemption Analysis 
a. Track 1: The State Effective-Vindication Exception Does Not 
Exist 
Sonic I violates the fundamental principle of FAA preemption 
that a state may not require a judicial or administrative forum for the 
resolution of claims that the contracting parties have agreed to re-
solve by arbitration even if the state-mandated forum is but a first 
stop before arbitration is allowed.136 In Preston u. Ferrer, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that, ''When parties agree to arbitrate all ques-
tions arising under a contract, the FAA supersedes state laws lodging 
primary jurisdiction in another forum, whether judicial or adminis-
trative."137 Preston involved the California Talent Agencies Act 
131. Id. at 140. 
132. Id. at 141. 
133. The court further found that such a contract was both a contract of adhesion 
and, thus, was procedurally unconscionable, and "markedly one-sided" in that it could 
11only benefit the employer at the expense of the employee" and, thus, \vas substan-
tively unconscionable. Id. at 145-46. 
134. Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 132 S. Ct. 496 (2011), 
135. See Docket (Register of Actions), Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc, v. Moreno, available 
at http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/dockets.cfm?dist=O&doc_id=l913 
305&doc_no=S174475 (noting supplemental briefing ordered). 
136. See Sonic-Calabasas, 247 P.3d at 161 (Chin, J. dissenting). 
137. Preston v. Ferrer, 522 U.S. 346, 359 (2008). 
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("TAA''), which vested exclusive original jurisdiction over a dispute 
arising under the TAA in the Labor Commissioner subject to de novo 
review in superior court following the Labor Commissioner's 
determination. ms 
In holding that the FAA preempted the exclusive jurisdiction 
provisions of the TAA, the Court rejected the argument that the TAA 
did not offend the FAA because it only postponed arbitration in that a 
party could seek arbitration rather than de novo review in superior 
court after the Labor Commissioner issued her ruling. The Court rea-
soned that, "A prime objective of an agreement to arbitrate is to 
achieve 'streamlined proceedings and expeditious results'"139 and 
that requiring initial reference of an otherwise arbitrable dispute to 
the Labor Commissioner would frustrate that objective even if arbi-
tration could follow. 140 The Court also rejected the argument that al-
lowing parties to arbitrate in lieu of an administrative hearing 
process "would undermine the Labor Commissioner's ability to stay 
informed of potential illegal activity ... and would deprive artists 
protected by the TAA of the Labor Commissioner's expertise."141 In 
sum, the Court held that, when the FAA applies, a state cannot re-
quire that an arbitrable claim be heard first in a non-arbitral forum, 
regardless of the state's reason for doing so. 
b. Track 2: The State Effective-Vindication 
Exception Does Exist 
Concepcion reinforces Preston's central holdings and makes clear 
that these principles apply even when the state seeks to regulate ar-
bitration via the effective-vindication exception by invoking public 
policy as a ground "for the revocation of any contract." In the lan-
guage of Concepcion, Sonic I "interferes with the fundamental attrib-
utes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the 
FAA."142 As previously noted, Sonic I adds a layer of delay and ex-
pense to the parties' arbitration agreement: the parties must first 
participate in an administrative hearing before they may proceed to 
arbitration. Moreover, Sonic I punishes an employer that enforces its 
contractual right to arbitrate and in so doing impermissibly "disfa-
vors arbitration."143 To obtain "de novo" review before the arbitrator, 
138. Id. at 351, 355. 
139. Id. at 357. 
140. Id. at 358; see also Sonic·Calabasas, 247 P.3d at 161 (Chin, J., dissenting). 
141. Preston, 552 U.S. at 358-59. 
142. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011). 
143. See id. at 1747. 
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the employer must post an undertaking in the full amount of the La-
bor Commissioner's award. Also, if the arbitrator awards the em-
ployee more than zero following a Berman hearing, the employer 
must pay the employee's attorney's fees. As did Preston, Concepcion . 
makes clear that California "cannot require [such) a procedure that is 
inconsistent with the FAA even if it is desirable for unrelated 
reasons."144 
The court in Sonic I sought to distinguish Preston by arguing 
that the statute in Preston "merely lodges primary jurisdiction in the 
Labor Commissioner, and does not come with the same type of statu-
tory protections as are found in the Berman hearing and posthearing 
procedures."145 The fact that the Berman process offers an employee 
special advantages in her effort to collect wages due her, however, 
cannot allow the state to obviate Preston's limitations. Indeed, litiga-
tion generally also offers claimants certain special advantages such 
as the rights to comprehensive discovery, certain rules of evidence, 
and ultimate disposition by ajury. Yet Concepcion makes clear that a 
state may not condition the enforceability of an arbitration agree-
ment on the availability of such special advantages.146 Moreover, 
even if waiver of the right to a Berman hearing process outside of 
arbitration "would seriously undermine the efficacy of the Berman 
hearing statutes,''147 such waiver "does not constitute the elimination 
of the right to pursue" a remedy for wages owed.148 Thus,ltalian Col-
ors Restaurant teaches that the effective-vindication exception will 
not exempt California's efforts to invalidate waivers of the Berman 
hearing process in favor of arbitration even if arbitration would be a 
"less convenient or less effective" mea.ns of vindication.149 California 
cannot escape preemption by labeling the Berman hearing process 
itself rather than the right to wages owed the "unwaivable statutory 
right" at issue any more than it could do so by applying that label to a 
litigation process with ~he right to comprehensive discovery, certain 
rules of evidence, and ultimate disposition by a jury. 
Indeed, in October 2013, the California Supreme Court conceded 
in Sonic II that the FAA preempts the California doctrine providing 
for an unwaivable right to a Berman hearing after all.150 The court 
144. Id. at 1753. 
145. Sonic-Calabasas, 247 P.3d at 150. 
146. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1747; see also Sonic-Calabasas, 247 P.3d at 162, 
166 (Chin, J., dissenting). 
147. Sonic-Calabasas, 247 P.3d at 141. 
148. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 (2013). 
149. Id. at 2318 n.4 (Kagan J., dissenting). 
150. Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 3ll P.3d 184, 198 (Cal. 2013). 
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reasoned in light of Concepcion that, "Because a Berman hearing 
causes arbitration to be substantially delayed, the unwaivability of 
such a hearing , , . interferes with a fundamental attribute of arbitra-
tion - namely, its objective 'to achieve streamlined proceedings and 
expeditious results.'"151 The court further acknowledged that the 
state public policy that grounds the Sonic I doctrine does not shield 
the doctrine from FAA preemption.1s2 
D. The Unwaivability Doctrine Respecting Representative Labor 
Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 ("PAGA'') 
Actions 
1. The Rule and Its Rationale 
California's "Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004" 
("PAGA") authorizes an employee to bring an action to recover civil 
penalties for Labor Code violations on her own behalf and on behalf 
of other current or former employees. 153 In general, any civil penal-
ties recovered by aggrieved employees under the PAGA are split with 
seventy-five percent going to the California Labor and Workforce De-
velopment Agency and twenty-five percent going to the aggrieved em-
ployees - not only to the employee who brought the PAGA action but 
also to the other employees who suffered the Labor Code violation. 154 
Thus, the employee bringing a representative PAGA action acts as a 
private attorney general to collect penalties from the employer, to 
punish and deter Labor Code violations, and to protect the public 
from the employer's illegal actions. Class action requirements do not 
apply to PAGA representative actions.155 
When an employee has signed an arbitration agreement agreeing 
to bring any claim against her employer in arbitration and waiving 
any right to bring a PAGA representative action in arbitration (or in 
court), two issues arise: whether the employee's waiver of her right to 
bring a PAGA representative action is enforceable under California 
law, and whether, if not, the FAA preempts California law invalidat-
ing the waiver. 
151. Id. at 198 (quoting Concepcion, 131 S. Ct at 1749). The court further held, 
ho\vever, that a contract waiving a Berman hearing in favor of arbitration might still 
be held unconscionable if the contract "make[s] the resolution of the wage dispute 
inaccessible and unaffordable." Id. at 204. 
152. Id. at 199. 
153. Cal. Labor Code §§ 2698-2699.5. 
154. Cal. Labor Code § 2699(i); Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC, 327 
P.3d 129, 148 (Cal. 2014), 
155. Arias v, Superior Court, 209 P.3d 923, 932 (Cal. 2009). 
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Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co. is the seminal California appellate 
case holding that (1) an arbitration waiver of a representative PAGA 
action is not enforceable under California law, and (2) the FAA does 
not preempt California law on this point.156 With respect to the first 
holding, the Brown court reasoned that a PAGA representative ac-
tion waiver is not enforceable under California law because such a 
waiver would defeat the purposes of the PAGA: "[Al single-claimant 
arbitration under the PAGA for individual penalties will not result in 
the penalties contemplated under the PAGA to punish and deter em-
ployer practices that violate the rights of numerous employees under 
the Labor Code."157 
In holding that the FAA does not preempt California's invalida-
tion of a PAGA representative action waiver, the Brown court first 
distinguished Concepcion, reasoning that Concepcion dealt with a 
private individual right of a consumer to pursue class action remedies 
but did not address a cause of action designed to protect the public 
rather than to benefit private parties.158 The court went on to reason 
in accord with a state effective-vindication exception that the FAA 
did not preempt California law because such preemption would de-
feat the purposes of the state law.159 "In short, representative actions 
under the PAGA do not conflict with the purposes of the FAA. If the 
FAA preempted state law as to the unenforceability of the PAGA rep-
resentative action waivers, the benefits of private attorney general 
actions to enforce state labor laws would, in large part, be nulli-
fied."1so Finally, the court added that because PAGA actions are not 
156. See Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d 854 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) 
(extending California's Broughton-Cruz rule to PAGA actions and holding that Con-
cepcion does not preempt a state rule regarding the unenforceability of a contractual 
waiver of an employee's right to pursue a representative action under the PAGA be-
cause "representative actions under the PAGA do not conflict with the purposes of the 
FAA"). 
157. Id. at 862; cf. Urbino v. Orkin Servs. of Cal., Inc., 882 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1164 
(C.D. Cal. 2011) (finding that "because the PAGA arbitration waiver contradicts the 
fundamental purpose of a representative enforcement action under PAGA, it is uncon-
scionable and unenforceable"), vacated an other grounds, 726 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 
2013). 
158. Brown, 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 860-£4; accord Plows v. Rockwell Collins, Inc. 
812 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1070 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (agreeing with the Brown court's reason-
ing with respect to this point). 
159. Brown, 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 862-£3. 
160. Id. 
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subject to class action requirements, a PAGA representative arbitra-
tion "would not have the attributes of a class action that the [Concep-
cion] case said conflicted with arbitration, such as class certification, 
notices, and opt-outs."161 
The California Supreme Court endorsed the unwaivability doc-
ti·ine respecting representative PAGA actions in its June 2014 Is-
kanian opinion - the same opinion, discussed above, in which the 
court held that the FAA preempted the Gentry doctrine.162 The court 
first held that under California law an agreement by an employee to 
waive her right to bring a representative PAGA action "is against 
public policy and may not be enforced."163 In so holding, the court 
reasoned that enforcement of such an agreement would "serve to dis-
able one of the primary mechanisms for enforcing the Labor Code" 
and, thus, would both impermissibly indirectly exempt an employer 
from responsibility for its violations of the Labor Code and impermis-
sibly allow a private agreement to contravene a law established for a 
public reason.164 The court cited the Brown court of appeal in con-
cluding that, even if an employee remains free to bring an individual 
PAGA claim, the employee's waiver of her right to bring a representa-
tive PAGA action would frustrate the PAGA's objectives. The court 
supported this conclusion by reasoning that the arbitration of an in-
dividual PAGA claim would not result in the types of penalties that 
the PAGA contemplates to deter employer violations of the Labor 
Code and to punish employer violations that do occur.165 
Having concluded that an employee's waiver of her right to bring 
a representative PAGA action "is contrary to public policy and unen-
forceable as a matter of state law"166 the court next turned to the 
question of whether the FAA preempted such a state rule. In answer-
ing this question, the court did not seriously address Concepcion or 
Italian Colors Restaurant. Rather, the court held that the FAA did 
not apply at all to the unwaivability doctrine respecting representa-
tive PAGA actions because the FAA is concerned only with the reso-
lution of private disputes whereas a PAGA action is not a private 
dispute:l6 7 "Simply put, a PAGA claim lies outside the FAA's cover-
age because it is not a dispute between an employer and an employee 
161. Id. at 503. 
162. Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC., 327 P.3d 129, 145-53, (Cal. 
2014). 
163. Id. at 148. 
164. Id. at 149. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. at 149. 
167. Id. 
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arising out of their contractual relationship. It is a dispute between 
an employer and the state" in that the employee's PAGA action ''func-
tions as a substitute for an action brought by the government 
itself."1as 
To support its novel conclusion that the FAA is concerned only 
with "private disputes," the court first cited to the F AA's text. Specifi-
cally, the court focused on language in section 2 referencing a con-
tract "to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of 
such contract or transaction." This phrase, the court reasoned, "is 
most naturally read to mean a dispute about the respective rights 
and obligations of parties in a contractual relationship."169 The court 
also cited to the F AA's legislative history, which the court found 
"shows that the F AA's primary object was the settlement of ordinary 
commercial disputes."170 "There is no indication," the court con-
cluded, "that the FAA was intended to govern disputes between the 
government in its law enforcement capacity and private 
individuals."171 
The California Supreme Court's reasoning in Iskanian might be 
criticized on several grounds. The court's interpretation of the FAA's 
text is implausible. The touchstone for FAA coverage is a written ar-
bitration provision in "a contract evidencing a transaction involving 
commerce."172 The natural reading of section 2 is that the FAA ap-
plies to any such contract regardless of the nature of the dispute to be 
arbitrated unless another provision of the FAA173 or another federal 
statute174 provides otherwise. No such other provision of the FAA or 
federal statute supports the California Supreme Court's holding. 
Moreover, the California Supreme Court's resort to the FAA's 
legislative history to support its interpretation of section 2 is uncon-
vincing. The court cites to the 1924 Congressional testimony of Julius 
Cohen, the principal drafter of the FAA, and Charles Bernheimer, the 
Chairman of the Committee on Arbitration of the New York State 
Chamber of Commerce, for the proposition that the FAA was in-
tended to apply only to disputes between merchants.175 It is all well 
and good to cite Cohen and Bernheimer to support the argument that 
the Supreme Court has gone off track in interpreting the scope of 
168. Id. at 151 (emphasis in original). 
169. Id. at 150. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. 
172. 9 u.s.c. § 2. 
173. See 9 U.S.C. § 1 (excluding certain contracts from the FAA's coverage). 
174. See infra note 223 (discussing several such statutes). 
175. Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC, 327 P.3d 129, 150 (Cal. 2014). 
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FAA coverage as broadly as it has: unquestionably, the Supreme 
Court's interpretation of the FAA has betrayed the drafters' original 
intent. Nonetheless, when faced with a mountain of Supreme Court 
jurisprudence interpreting the FAA broadly, a state court is not free 
to side with the ghost of Julius Cohen. 
Moreover, even if one were to accept the California Supreme 
Court's interpretation of the FAA as being concerned only with "en-
sur[ing) an efficient forum for the resolution of private disputes,"176 
one might question the court's characterization of Iskanian's lawsuit 
as falling outside that scope. Iskanian was a private employee who 
entered into a contract with his private employer in which he agreed 
that he would submit "any and all claims" against his employer to 
private binding arbitration. 177 Iskanian later brought a lawsuit 
against his employer on his own behalf and on behalf of other private 
employees of the employer for violations of the Labor Code. Iskanian 
had standing to bring his PAGA claim only because he was "an ag-
grieved employee" of the employer as the PAGA defines that term -
"any person who was employed by the alleged violator [of the Labor 
Code) and against whom one or more of the alleged violations was 
committed."178 Indeed, Iskanian's complaint alleged that his em-
ployer's practices with respect to himself and other private employees 
violated the Labor Code. Iskanian sought civil penalties for himself 
and other private employees that would go directly into his own 
pocket and the pockets of his fellow employees.179 Even though sev-
enty-five percent of the penalties collected would go to the state, it is 
difficult to accept the court's conclusion that such "a PAGA claim ... 
is not a dispute between an employer and an employee arising out of 
their contractual relationship."180 Accordingly, this Article shall pro-
ceed to examine whether California's unwaivability doctrine respect-
ing representative PAGA actions can survive FAA preemption 
analysis assuming that the FAA does apply to such an action. 
176. Id at 149. 
177. Id. at 133 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
178. Id. at 157 (internal quotation marks omitted); Cal. Lab. Code§ 2699(c) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). 
179. Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC, 327 P.3d 129, 146 (2014). 
180. Id. at 146, 151; see also id. at 155 (Chin, J., concurring) (arguing that the 
dispute in this case "arises, first and fundamenfally, out of [the employment] relation· 
ship" between Iskanian and his employer). 
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Concepcion makes clear that the unwaivability doctrine respect-
ing representative PAGA actions is inconsistent with the FAA.181 
Even though a representative PAGA action would not present the 
class certification, notice, and opt-out issues that are normally con-
sidered incompatible with the FAA, requiring the allowance of PAGA 
representative actions in arbitration would provide employers with a 
substantial disincentive to arbitrate such that the reasonable em-
ployer may forgo arbitration. Arbitration of a representative PAGA 
action in which penalties relating to multiple employees are aggre-
gated presents the risk of an enormously costly error in arbitration 
that will go uncorrected in light of the extremely deferential judicial 
review to which arbitration awards are subject. 18 2 The Court ad-
dressed such a disincentive in Concepcion: "We find it hard to believe 
that defendants would bet the company with no effective means of 
review, and even harder to believe that Congress would have in-
tended to allow state courts to force such a decision."183 
b. Track 2: The State Effective-Vindication Exception 
Does Exist 
The state effective-vindication exception does not save the un-
waivability doctrine respecting representative PAGA actions. Central 
to the holding in Brown is the notion that a state public policy 
preempts the FAA whenever the FAA otherwise would undermine 
the state public policy. At first blush, this notion would appear to 
181. See e.g., Velazquez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 13cv680-WQH-DHB, 2013 
WL 4525581, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2013) (discussing Concepcion and holding that 
the FAA preempts the unwaivability doctrine respecting representative PAGA ac-
tions); Andrade v. P.F. Chang's China Bistro, No. 12CV2724 JLS JMA, 2013 WL 
5472589, at *10 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2013) (same). 
182. See Quevedo v. Macy's, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1142 (C.D. Cal. 2011) 
(holding that requiring a PAGA representative action in arbitration would conflict 
with the FAA's purposes because such an action would "make for a slower, more 
costly process" and "representative PAGA claims increase risks to defendants by ag-
gregating the claims of many employees") (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concep-
cion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1752 (2011)) (internal quotation omitted); Grabowski v. C.H. 
Robinson Co., 817 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1180-81 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (adopting the reasoning 
of Quevedo and rejecting tile reasoning of Brown); Miguel v. J.P Morgan Chase Bank, 
N.A., No. CV 12-3308 PSG (PLAx), 2013 WL 452418, at *9-10 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2013) 
(adopting the reasoning of Quevedo). 
183. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1752 (2011) (footnote 
omitted). 
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turn the Supremacy Clause on its head.184 It is likely, however, that 
the Brown court merely was invoking a blunt formulation of the state 
effective-vindication exception. Stated more fully, the notion is that 
Congress intended for a state public policy to preempt the FAA when-
ever the FAA otherwise would undermine the state public policy. 
This notion finds no support, however, in the U.S. Supreme 
Court's FAA preemption jurisprudence. Indeed, the Court has held 
clearly that the FAA trumps any state public policy that conflicts 
with the federal policy in favor of arbitration that grounds the FAA. 
In Perry v. Thomas, for example, the Court considered whether the 
. FAA preempted a section of the California Labor Code that provided 
that an action for the collection of wages may be maintained in court 
"without regard to the existence of any private agreement to arbi-
trate."185 The employee in Perry argued that, "the State's interest in 
protecting wage earners outweighs the federal interest in uniform 
dispute resolution."186 In holding that the FAA preempted the Cali-
forn_ia statute, the Court expressly rejected this argument stating, 
"Section 2 is a congressional declaration of a liberal policy favoring 
arbitration agreements notwithstanding any state substantive or 
procedural policies to the contrary."187 Concepcion makes clear that 
this fundamental principle of FAA preemption applies even when the 
state purports to act pursuant to section 2's Saving Clause. Rejecting 
the argument that class proceedings were essential to prosecute 
small-value claims that otherwise would not be worth pursuing as 
individual claims, the Court in Concepcion reiterated that "States 
cannot require a procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA, even if 
it is desirable for unrelated reasons."188 
Italian Colors Restaurant also suggests that the state effective-
vindication exception, if it exists, does not authorize the state to in-
validate an employee's waiver of her right to bring a representative 
PAGA action in arbitration. Such a waiver "does not constitute the 
184. Cf Luchini v. Carmax, Inc., No. CV F 12-0417 WO DLB, 2012 WL 3862150, 
at •s (E.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2012) (discussing Concepcwn and concluding that "[a] PAGA 
claim is a state-law claim, and states may not exempt claims from the FAA1' (citations 
omitted)). 
185. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 484 (1987) (quoting Cal. Lab. Code Ann. 
§ 229) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
186. Id. at 486. 
187. Id. at 489, 491 (citations omitted) (internal quotations marks omitted). 
188. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753; see also Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, 
LLC, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 372, 384 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012), review granted and opinion 
superseded by 286 P.3d 147 (Cal. Sep. 19, 2012) (concluding that under Concepcion it 
is "irrelevant" that a PAGA action can effectively promote the public interest only ifit 
takes place outside of arbitration). 
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elimination of [any employee's] right to pursue" penalties under the 
PAGA.1a9 Each employee remains free to bring an individual claim to 
enforce the Labor Code and to deter and penalize the employer with 
respect to Labor Code violations that relate to her personally. 190 
Whether or not it is worth the expense for any individual employee to 
prove her individual case is not of concern under the effective-vindi-
cation exception.191 Moreover, Justice Kagan's dissent in Italian Col-
ors Restaurant suggests that the fact that an individual PAGA action 
is "less convenient or less effective" than a representative PAGA ac-
tion is also not a concern under the effective-vindication exception. rn2 
Finally, even assuming a series of Labor Code violations that 
would not be worth the expense of pursuing on an individual basis, 
the state retains the right to pursue civil penalties relating to multi-
ple employees to vindicate its interests that would otherwise be vindi-
cated in an employee-brought PAGA representative action. California 
is not a party to the employment arbitration agreement between the 
employer and its employee. Moreover, an employment arbitration 
189. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 (2013) (cita-
tion omitted). 
190. See Parvataneni v. E*Trade Fin. Corp., 967 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1301 n.1, 1305 
(N.D. Cal. 2013) (rejecting the view that PAGA claims cannot be brought on an indi-
vidual basis and holding that an arbitration agreement may waive an employee's 
right to bring a representative PAGA claim since the employee "may still attempt to 
vindicate his rights by arbitrating his PAGA claims individually''). Some courts have 
held that the PAGA does not authorize an employee to bring a separate individual 
claim: rather an individual may maintain a PAGA action only as a representative 
action. See Brown v. Superior Court, 157 Cal. Rptr. 3d 779, 791 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013); 
Cunningham v. Leslie's Poolmart, Inc., No. CV 13-2122 CAS (CWx), 2013 WL 
3233211, at *8 (C.D. Cal. June 25, 2013). If that interpretation were correct, a waiver 
of the right to bring a PAGA representative action would indeed constitute the elimi-
nation of the employee's right to pursue a PAGA claim. See Brown, 157 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
at 791; Cunningham, 2013 WL 3233211 at *9. Whether or not the FAA would pre-
empt a state doctrine voiding such a waiver would then depend on whether or not the 
state effective-vindication exception exists. See Brown, 157 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 781 (hold-
ing, in a case decided two weeks prior to Italian Colors Restaurant, that an arbitra-
tion agreement waiving the right to bring a representative PAGA claim "is 
unenforceable because it wholly precludes the exercise of this unwaivable statutory 
right" (citation omitted)); Cunningham, 2013 WL 323321 at *9 (citing and quoting 
Italian Colors Restaurant in support of the holding that the FAA does not preempt a 
doctrine voiding an arbitration waiver of a PAGA representative action since such a 
waiver would wholly preclude the PAGA cause of action and an "arbitration provision 
need not be enforced to the extent that it forbids the assertion of statutory rights" 
(internal quotation omitted)). 
191. See Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. at 2311 (citation omitted). 
192. See id. at 2318 n.4. 
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agreement between employer and employee cannot foreclose direct 
enforcement by California.193 
In sum, each of California's four principal employment arbitra-
tion doctrines is grounded on two premises. First, the California em-
ployment regulation at issue with respect to the doctrine not only 
protects the private interests of employees but also serves a compel-
ling public interest. Second, arbitration of claims asserting the statu-
tory right at issue not only impedes the effective vindication of the 
employee's statutory right at issue but also imperils the compelling 
public interest. 
The FAA, however, as the U.S. Supreme Court has recently in-
terpreted it, is wholly unconcerned with state public interests, no 
matter how compelling. Consequently, FAA preemption of state em-
ployment arbitration doctrine puts at risk the public interests that 
ground regulation of the employment 1·elationship. This Article next 
turns to an argument that the FAA should be amended to allow for 
consideration of the extent to which arbitration threatens the ability 
of workers to effectively vindicate their statutory employment rights 
and, relatedly, undermines the ability of those statutory employment 
rights to serve the public interest. 
V. AN ARGUMENTS FOR FEDERAL ALLOWANCE OVERSIGHT 
This Part proceeds by first setting out an argument for the spe-
cial regulation of employment arbitration separate and apart from 
any regulation of consumer arbitration: unlike consumer arbitration, 
employment arbitration threatens interacting private and public in-
terests relating to both individual and group identity and equality. 
Next, this Part identifies several pitfalls facing potential reform pro-
posals and prnposes a compromise solution that is premised on re-
structuring federal oversight of state employment arbitration 
doctrine. 
193. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 279 (2002) (holding that an 
arbitration agreement between an employer and its employee does not foreclose the 
EEOC's efforts to obtain in court victim-specific relief relating to the employee). 
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A. The Stakes in Employment Arbitration Regulation 
Distinguished from Those in Consumer Arbitration 
Regulation: Implications for Individual and Group 
Identity and Equality 
[Vol. 20:1 
As demonstrated above, Concepcion and Italian Colors Restau-
rant make clear that the FAA preempts any state arbitration regula-
tion that disadvantages arbitration. This is so regardless of the public 
policy that grounds the regulation and regardless of whether the reg-
ulation is necessary to ensure that a claimant may effectively vindi-
cate her state statutory rights. In the employment context 
specifically, it is irrelevant to FAA preemption whether the state ar-
bitration regulation is necessary to protect the rights of workers or 
the general public interest. 
This Article postulates that Concepcion and Italian Colors Res-
taurant also make elem· the need for Congress to amend the FAA. As 
a normative matter, the FAA should allow for consideration of the 
public interest in determining whether an employment arbitration 
agreement will be enforceable.194 Specifically, the FAA should allow 
for consideration of the need for a worker to effectively vindicate her 
state statutory rights and for consideration of her ability to do so in 
arbitration. 
In negotiating the terms of an employment relationship, an em-
ployer typically possesses both greater bargaining power and more 
complete relevant information than its employee.195 Thus, a domi-
nant rationale for regulation of the employment relationship is the 
asserted need to guard against the employer's leveraging of these im-
balances to exploit its worker. 196 Statutes and regulations governing 
the payment of a minimum wage and overtime compensation and es-
tablishing workplace health and safety standards are the paradig-
matic examples. 197 In the context of arbitration agreements required 
194. See Maureen A. Weston, The Accidental Preemption Statute: The Federal Ar· 
bitrationAct and Displacement of Agency Regulation, 5 Y.B. ON ARB. & MEnIA1'ION 59, 
60 (2013) ("Increasingly, the FAA preemption doctrine is "unworkable" and unneces-
sarily constrains states' ability to implement public policy."). 
195. See e.g., Marion Crain, Arm's-Length Intimacy: Employment as Relationship, 
35 WABH. U. J.L. & Pm,'v 163, 166-67 & n.12 (2011). 
196. See Stewart J. Schwab, Predicting the Future of Employment Law: Reflecting 
or Refracting Market Forces?, 76 IND. L.J. 29, 47-48 (2001) (asserting that concerns 
with the greater bargaining power enjoyed by employers and the possible exploitation 
of workers arising therefrom are the asserted justification for much employment 
regulation). 
197. See Crain, supra note 195, at 182 (citing the Fair Labor Standards Act and 
the Occupational Safety and Health Act as examples of statutes enacted in response 
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as a condition of employment, critics of employment arbitration fre-
quently voice the concern that the employer will use its superior bar-
gaining strength and sophistication to impose upon its worker an 
arbitration agreement that might make it more difficult if not im-
practicable for the worker to vindicate her rights against the em-
ployer.198 It is indeed troubling and somewhat ironic that an 
employer might use its superior bargaining position to impose upon 
its worker an arbitration agreement that would then neuter employ-
ment regulation specifically intended to safeguard that worker from 
abuses made possible by the employer's bargaining power and infor-
mational advantages.199 
Critics of consumer arbitration voice similar concerns: a commer-
cial interest may leverage its bargaining and informational advan-
tages to impose upon a consumer a contract of adhesion mandating 
an arbitral forum with features that render it impracticable for the 
consumer to vindicate her interests in the arbitral forum. 200 As with 
critics of employment arbitration, a great concern of critics of con-
sumer arbitration is that arbitration agreements that include a 
waiver of any right to bring a class or collective action may leave the 
adhering party with no viable means to vindicate small value 
claims.201 
to "(t]he potential for the exploitation of less powerful workers in slack labor 
markets"). 
198. See Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of 
Statistics in Judicial Revrew of Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L. 
REV. 223, 240 (1998) (discussing the repeat player advantage in selecting an arbitra-
tor); E. Gary Spitko, Exempting High-Level Employees and Small Employers from 
Legislation Inualidating Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 43 U.C. DA-
VIS L. REV. 591, 612-13 (2009) (discussing such concerns). Cf Paul H. Haagen, New 
Wineskins for New Wine: The Need to Encourage Fairness in Mandatory Arbitration, 
40 Amz. L. REV. 1039, 1059--00 (1998) (arguing that public policy supports requiring a 
party seeking to impose a "mandatory arbitration" agreement to provide reliable in-
formation concerning the choice between arbitration and litigation to the party lack-
ing such information). 
199. See In re Poly-America, L.P., Ind., 262 S.W.3d. 337, 352 (Tex. 2008) (making 
essentially this point). 
200. See Yelnosky, supra note 26, at 736 (asserting that "the major arbitration 
issue of our time" is "the imposition on consumers and employees of arbitration agree-
ments that effectively deprive them of the ability to vindicate their federal- or state-
law rights"). 
201. See, e.g., David S. Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, 
87 IND. L.J. 239, 242, 268 (2012) (expressing this concern with respect to the "(t]wo 
paradigm examples" of consumer and employment claims 11that cannot feasibly be 
brought on an indivjdual basis"); Stipanowich, supra note 1, at 336 (opining that 
"class action waivers have become the single most contentious issue surrounding con-
sumer and employment arbitration agreements"); id. at 371; Sarah Rudolph Cole, On 
Babres and Bathwater: The Arbitration Fairness Act and the Supreme Court's Recent 
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Given the many common criticisms, it should not surprise that 
reform proposals targeting the FAA often lump together consumer 
arbitration and employment arbitration.202 Most prominently, the 
proposed so-called Arbitration Fairness Act would void predispute ar-
bitration agreements relating to consumer or employment claims.203 
A compelling case can be made, however, that employment law is spe-
cial in ways that justify a separate regime of employment arbitration 
regulation, notwithstanding the merits of arguments for stricter lim-
its on consumer arbitration. 
The case for special treatment under the FAA of employment ar-
bitration regulation relies upon interacting private and public inter-
ests relating to both individual and group identity and equality. The 
argument begins with the proposition that the employment relation-
ship is central to the lives of most workers. First, for most workers, 
their employment is critical to maintaining their standard of living. 
Moreover, for many workers, their employment is a core aspect of 
their self-concept, a central source for fostering emotional and social 
connections, and a key variable influencing their standing in the com-
munity.204 Professor Marion Crain has captured well the ways in 
which work influences self-concept and social standing: "Working 
confers self-sufficiency, dignity, standing in society, and membership 
in the social structure. Not to work means dependence, failure, de-
clining social status, insecurity, and shame."205 
Given the centrality of work in the lives of most workers, many 
workers invest substantial human capital in ways that are specific to 
their present employer. They specialize within the firm and develop 
knowledge, skills, and relationships that the employment market 
Arbitration Jurisprudence, 48 Rous, L. REV. 457, 464-71 (2011) (arguing that "the 
most pressing issue in consumer arbitration, in the wake of recent Supreme Court 
decisions, is the lack of a viable forum for consumers ,vith low value claims"). 
202. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 2, at 760, 781...{;8 (categorizing employment arbitra-
tion and consumer arbitration as arbitration "imposed by repeat players on one-shot 
players" and calling for a separate federal arbitration act that would govern only arbi-
tration agreements bet\veen such "parties with disparate negotiating incentives"); 
Stipanowich, supra note 1, at 327 (arguing in favor of "carefully crafted legislation or 
administrative regulations limiting or regulating the use of arbitration agreements in 
consumer and employment contracts"), 
203. See R.R. 1844, S. 878, 113th Cong. (2013); R.R. 1873, S. 987, 112th Cong. 
(2011). 
204. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Employment Law and Social Equality, 112 
MICH. L. REV. 225, 238 (2013) (''For the worker, losing one's job can cause one to lose 
the means of making a living and obtaining self-respect and respect from the commu-
nity."); Crain, supra note 195, at 165, 167, 169, 171-72. 
205. Crain, supra note 195, at 199. 
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outside of the firm may not value highly if at all.206 Simultaneously, 
they and their families set down roots in the community that might 
make relocation fOl' new employment opportunities impracticable. 2 0 7 
Thus, in making these firm-specific investments of human capital 
and community-specific personal commitments, workers lock-them-
selves in to their present employer in ways that ultimately further 
disempower the worker and further enable employer exploitation. 20s 
Surveying these typical features of the employment relationship, 
Professor Samuel Bagenstos has concluded that "employment prac-
tices are particularly likely to implicate issues of social equality and 
that, when they do so, the law should presumptively regulate those 
practices to remove the most significant threats to" social equality. 209 
Specifically, Professor Bagenstos argues that the centrality of em-
ployment to a worker's life and the power that an employer and its 
supervisors may have over the worker together threaten to establish 
and entrench hierarchies of social status separate and apart from in-
equalities in economic position. 210 He calls, therefore, for apprnpriate 
regulation of the employment relationship to minimize the likelihood 
that inequalities in economic position will lead to broader hierarchies 
that prevent some workers from participating as full and equal mem-
bers in society and, indeed, so as to promote equality in social rela-
tions both within and apart from the employment relationship.2 11 
Turning to the issue of employment arbitration, Professor Bagen-
stos argues that, in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's recent arbitra-
tionjurisprudence, employment arbitration required as a condition of 
employment poses a "quite significant threat" to social equality.2 1 2 
206. Id. at 164, 200. 
207. Id. at 164, 200; cf. Naomi Schoenbaum, Mobility Measures, 2012 B.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1169, 1194, 1209 (2012) (arguing that "there are reasons to believe that informa-
tion deficits and cogoitive biases lead individuals and employers to underestimate the 
costs of mobility under the current regime, limiting their ability to reach welfare-
maximizing decisions" and discussing the "underappreciated costs of [worker] 
mobility''). 
208. Crain, supra note 195, at 199. 
209. Bagenstos, supra note 204, at 238; see also id. at 243-73 (expounding on this 
argument). 
210. Id. at 232, 237, 244. 
211. Id. at 236, 243-44; see also Brishen Rogers, Justice at Work: Minimum Wage 
Laws and Social Equality, 92 TEx. L. REV. 1543, 1597 (2014) (defending minimum 
wage laws on the ground that they "mitigate work-based class and status distinctions 
and enhance low-\vage workets' self-respect"). 
212. Bagenstos, supra note 204, at 267-69. 
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He points out that a worker's ability to hold her employer accounta-
ble for violation of her rights is critical to social equality.21a Yet, the 
central holdings of Concepcion, if extended to the employment arbi-
tration context, would undermine the ability of a worker to have her 
claims against her employer adjudicated.214 Thus, Professor Bagen-
stos concludes that, "an extension of the Court's analysis [in Concep-
cion] to the employment setting would raise serious social equality 
concerns."215 
Aside from the impact of the employment relationship on individ-
ual well-being and self-concept, employment practices also have long 
been critical to the formation and maintenance of social understand-
ings relating to group identities. For example, employment discrimi-
nation against African-Americans has long been grounded in and 
reinforced the notion that, for biologic or cultural reasons, black 
workers have a lesser capacity for certain employment than white 
workers.216 Similarly, employment discrimination against women 
has long been grounded in and reinforced the belief that, because of 
physiological and emotional differences between men and women, 
women are ill-suited to certain "men's work."217 Moreover, much em-
ployment discrimination against gay and lesbian workers is 
grounded in and reinforces the social understanding that gay people 
are morally and spiritually inferior to straight people and, thus, 
openly gay people must be excluded from working in certain role 
model occupations. 21s 
Government regulation proscribing such employment discrimi-
nation is a critical component of efforts to counter these subordinat-
ing narratives.219 Anti-discrimination statutes teach that denying a 
213. ld. at 264, 268; see also Rogers, supra note 211, at 1575 (arguing that the 
statutory ''entitlement [to a minimum \vage] and its accompanying rjght of action al-
ter the p-0wer dynamics between employer and employee" and that "legal rights, par-
ticularly rights against private parties, can be an important social basis of self-
respect"). 
214. See Bagenstos, supra note 204, at 268. 
215. ld. at 269. 
216. See NANCY MACLEAN, FREEDOM Is NOT ENOUGH: THE OPENING OF THE AMERI-
CAN WORKPLACE 49, 63, 74, 227 (2006). 
217. ld. at 125-26, 129. 
218. E. Gary Spitko, Don't Ask, Don't Tell: Emplayment Discrimination as a Means 
for Social Cleansing, 16 EMP. RTS. & EMP. PoL'Y. J. 179, 186-91 (2012). 
219. See, e.g., SAMUEL ESTREICHER & GILLIAN LESTER, EMPLOYMENT. LAW 7 (2008) 
(making the point that employment regulation is a means for society to implement its 
values); Robert C. Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidis-
crimination Law, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1, 30-,'Jl, 40 (2000) (recognizing that "[t]he domi-
nant conception of American antidiscrimination la\v aspires to suppress categories of 
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worker an employment opportunity on the basis of a prohibited char-
acteristic is inconsistent with society's core values. 220 Such anti-dis-
crimination statutes are critical as well to efforts to dismantle 
occupational segregation intrinsic to these narratives. 221 An employ-
ment arbitration agreement that makes impracticable a worker's ef-
forts to vindicate her rights under such an anti-discrimination 
prohibition retards the statute's effectiveness at establishing, main-
taining, and strengthening the equality norm as well as countering 
the harmful effects of violations of that norm. 
In sum, the centrality of the employment relationship to the lives 
of workers and the implications of employment practices for social 
understandings and realities relating to both individual and group 
identity and equality suggest a need for regulation of employment 
arbitration quite distinguishable from any need for regulation of con-
sumer arbitration or, for that matter, of franchise arbitration or of 
securities arbitration, which like employment arbitration and con-
sumer arbitration frequently are concerns of arbitration critics.222 
Thus, one might reasonably call for special treatment under the FAA 
of employment arbitration regulation that would allow states greater 
power to ensure that workers may effectively vindicate their unwaiv-
able state statutory rights. This Article turns now to consideration of 
how such reform should be structured. 
social judgment that are deemed likely to be infected with prejudice" and acknowledg-
ing that this dominant conception has "driv[en] important and far-reaching changes 
in the social practices of gender and race11 but arguing for a "sociological account" of 
antidiscrimination la\V in which antidiscrimination law is understood "as transform-
ing preexisting social practices, such as race or gender, by reconstructing the social 
identities of persons"); Deborah L. Rhode, The Injustice of Appearance, 61 STAN. L. 
REV. 1033, 1071, 1096 (2009) (discussing the power of civil rights legislation to 
reshape public values). 
220. See Thomas B. Stoddard, Bleeding Heart: Reflections on Using Law to Make 
Social Change, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 975 (1997) (arguing that, "At least in part 
because of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 - the most important statutory embodiment 
of the ideal of racial justice - American culture, American government, and the 
American people have absorbed the concepts of equality and integration embodied in 
the Act as the proper ethical framework for the resolution of issues of race"). 
221. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, "Rational Discritnination," Accommodation, and 
the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 839 (2003) (arguing that 
"[a]ntidiscrimination law is best justified as a policy tool that aims to dismantle pat-
terns of group-based social subordination, and that does so principally by integrating 
members of previously excluded, socially salient groups throughout important posi-
tions in society''). 
222. See Stipanowich, supra note 1, at 418 (noting that "more [foreign] jurisdic-
tions deny enforcement to arbitration agreements in employment contracts than in 
consumer contracts" and that "[t]his stance reflects, among other things, the percep-
tion that employment disputes often implicate fundamental human rights"). 
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B. The Structure of Federal Allowance Oversight 
1. Too Much Federal Regulation: A General Ban on 
Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements 
[Vol. 20:1 
One oft-suggested approach to reform would invalidate predis-
pute employment arbitration agreements generally. Indeed, in recent 
years, a number of bills have been introduced in Congress· that to 
varying degrees would have invalidated predispute employment arbi-
tration agreements. The most extreme of these bills would have in-
validated all predispute employment arbitration agreements.223 
Other bills would have invalidated only predispute arbitration 
clauses that required arbitration of employment claims arising under 
the Constitution or federal statutes. 224 
None of these bills has proven politically viable. 225 In general, 
they have been widely criticized as overbroad in their approach to 
223. See, e.g., Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, H.R. 1844, S. 878, 113th Cong. 
(2013); Arbitration Fairness Act of2011, H.R. 1873, S. 987, 112th Cong. (2011); Arbi-
tration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, lllth Cong. (2009); Arbitration Fairness Act 
of 2009, S. 931, lllth Cong. (2009); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, H.R. 3010, S. 
1782, llOth Cong. (2007). In recent years, Congress has banned non-negotiable arbi· 
tration clauses in a variety of contexts. See Motor Vehicles Franchise Contract Arbi-
tration Fairness Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2) (2001) (prohibiting motor vehicle 
manufacturers} importers, and distributors from requiring arbitration under their 
franchise agreements); Dep't of Def. Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 112-10, 125 Stat. 
38 § 8102(a)(l).(2) (2011) (prohibiting government contractors from requiring arbitra-
tion of Title VII claims or tort claims arising from a sexual assault or harassment); 
John Warner Nat'! Def. Authorization Act, 10 U.S.C. § 987(e)(3) (2012) (making it 
unla,vful for a consumer creditor to require an active duty service me1nber, her 
spouse, child, or dependent to submit to arbitration a claim involving the extension of 
consumer credit); Food Conservation and Energy Act, 7 U.S.C. § 197c(a)(b) (2012) (al-
lowing an agricultural producer or grower to decline to be bound by an arbitration 
provision prior to entering into a livestock or poultry contract); The Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 
§§ 748, 921, 1028, 1414 (2010) (banning arbitration agreements with respect to 
whistleblower claims on commodities fraud(§ 748) or securities fraud(§ 921), grant-
ing the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau the power to prohibit preclispute arbi-
tration provisions in consurner financial products and services contracts (§ 1028), 
banning predispute arbitration clauses in residential mortgages and home equity 
loans (§ 1414), and authorizing the SEC to prohibit or limit predispute arbitration 
agreements between a broker or securities dealer and a customer if the SEC finds 
that such regulation would be "in the public interest and for the protection of inves-
tors" (§ 921(a))). 
224. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 2008, H.R. 5129, S 2554, llOth Cong. § 423 
(2008); Preservation of Civil Rights Protections Act of 2005, H.R. 2969, 109th Cong. 
(2005); Civil Rights Act of 2004, H.R. 3809, S 2088, 108th Cong. § 423 (2004). 
225. One might argue, however, that the Department of Defense Appropriations 
Act prohibiting government contractors from requiring arbitration of Title VII claims 
or tort claims arising from a sexual assault or harassment, see Pub. L. No. 112-10, 
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reform. 226 This author has argued elsewhere, for example, that these 
attempts at reform fail to appreciate that many of the common con-
cerns respecting employment arbitration and many of the benefits of 
employment arbitration do not have equal force across the spectrum 
of employees and employers. With respect to enforcement of a predis-
pute employment arbitration agreement, it makes sense to consider, 
for example, how the general counsel of Apple Inc. is situated differ-
ently as an employee than the worker who cleans her office. It makes 
sense also to consider, for example, how Apple Inc. is situated differ-
ently as an employe1· than the five-person start-up firm down the 
road. Thus, this author has argued, such reforms should exempt from 
their scope employment arbitration agreements entered into by cer-
tain high-level employees as well as those entered into by relatively 
smaller employers.221 
More generally, an FAA amendment that would invalidate all 
predispute employment arbitration agreements or even only a subset 
of such agreements that relate to claims arising under the Constitu-
tion or a federal statute would be fa1· too crude an instrument to ad-
dress the common concerns with predispute employment arbitration 
agreements. As contrasted with litigation, employment arbitration 
offers the potential for a more knowledgeable, cost-effective, expedi-
tious, and private adjudication of an employee-employer dispute.228 A 
complete ban on the enforcement of predispute employment arbitra-
tion agreements, therefore, would discard the baby with the 
bathwater. A more thoughtful and flexible approach is called for. 
2. Too Little Federal Regulation: The Reverse 
Preemption Approach 
The most flexible approach to reform of the relationship between 
the FAA and state regulation of employment arbitration would 
amend the FAA to give each state carte blanche to determine the ex-
tent to which any predispute employment arbitration agreement may 
125 Stat. 38 § 8102(a)(l)--{2) (2011), has gone a long way toward implementing the 
goals of these bills related to employment arbitration. 
226. See, e.g., Peter B. Rutledge, Who Can Be Against Fairness? The Case Against 
the Arbitration Fairness Act, 9 CAJ1oozo J. CONFLICT RllSOL. 267, 269, 281 (2008) (ac-
knowledging that the arbitration system is flawed but criticizing the Arbitration Fair-
ness Act's 1~ackhammer approach to arbitration reform"); Stipanowich, supra note 1, 
at 400-404. But see Schwartz, supra note 201, at 240 (arguing that "[t]he Arbitration 
Faimess Act should be passed because consumer and employment disputes are too 
important a henhouse to be governed by contracts written by foxes"). 
227. See Spitko, supra note 198, at 62~2, 646-49. 
228. See id. at 605---08 (discussing the virtues of employment arbitration). 
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be enforced. Federal law already provides for such a "reverse preemp-
tion" approach in the context of insurance regulation: the McCarran-
Ferguson Act ("MFA") provides generally that state law preempts 
federal law with respect to the regulation of "the business of insur-
ance" and the interpretation of insurance contracts. Specifically, the 
MFA provides that, "No Act of Congress shall be construed to invali-
date, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any state for the pur-
pose of regulating the business of insurance . . . unless such Act 
specifically relates to the business ofinsurance."229 The FAA does not 
specifically relate to the business of insurance. Thus, states are free 
to regulate arbitration agreements to the extent that the arbitration 
regulation relates to the business of insurance. 230 
In the context of employment arbitration, the reverse preemption 
approach would empower each state to tailor its regulation of employ-
ment arbitration in light of the peculiarities of the state's employ-
ment laws and the specific challenges arbitration might present to a 
worker seeking to vindicate her statutory rights arising under those 
employment laws. One might expect that even with this authority 
some states would take a hands-off approach to the regulation of 
predispute employment arbitration agreements in an effort to attract 
arbitration business to their jurisdiction.231 Given that most employ-
ment arbitration agreements are drafted by employers and imposed 
on employees as a condition of employment on an adhesive basis, a 
state might seek to attract arbitration business by assuring employ-
ers that their employment arbitration agreements will be enforced in 
the jurisdiction. 
Other states, however, likely would regulate predispute employ-
ment arbitration agreements heavily in an effort to safeguard the 
public interests that ground their employment laws. The track record 
of various states regulating arbitration agreements relating to insur-
ance contracts is instructive. Nearly one-third of the states have stat-
utes that purport to invalidate all or nearly all predispute arbitration 
agreements relating to contracts of insurance.232 A number of state 
229. 15 u.s.c. § 1012(b). 
230. Notwithstanding the MFA, the states remain subject to constitutional limits 
in their regulation of the business of insurance. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 
869, 881-83 (1985). 
231. See generally Erin O'Hara O'Connor & Peter B. Rutledge, Arbitration, The 
Law Market, and the Law of Lawyering, 38 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 87 (2014) (seeking 
to test empirically for effects of jurisdictional competition for domestic arbitration 
business). 
232. See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-108-230; Ga. Code. Ann § 9-9-2; Haw. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 431:10-221; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 5-401; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 417.050; La. Rev. 
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and federal courts have held that the MFA allows these states to re-
verse preempt the FAA to enforce this state statutory law banning 
insurance arbitration.233 Thus, in the employment arbitration con-
text, the concern arises that under the reverse preemption approach 
a state may give too little weight to the interest of employers and 
employees in realizing the virtues of employment arbitration. Indeed, 
California's track record regulating employment arbitration suggests 
that the likely result of a reverse preemption approach in California, 
and perhaps in other states, would mirror the outcome under the 
most extreme legislation that Congress has considered in recent 
years respecting predispute employment arbitration agreements - a 
blanket invalidation of such agreements. 
3. A Compromise Approach: Federal Agency Allowance 
Oversight of State Employment Arbitration 
Regulation 
The optimal approach to reform would accomplish two goals. 
First, an optimal approach would provide a meaningful federal safe-
guard for the interest of employers and employees in realizing the 
benefits of employment arbitration. Second, such an approach would 
Stat. Ann. § 22:629; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 175 § 22; Mo. Rev. Stat.§ 435.350; 
Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 25-2602.01; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 1855(D); S.C. Code Ann. 
§ 15-48-10(b)(4); S.D. Codified Laws § 21-25A-3; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 5653; Va. 
Code. Ann. § 38.2-312; Wash. Rev. Code. Ann. § 48.18.200(l)(b); see also State Laws 
Regulating Arbitration in Insurance Contracts, PUBLIC CITIZEN (visited Jan. 30, 2014) 
http://www.citizen.org/congress/article_redirect.cfm?ID=6560 (listing and describing 
various statutes). 
233. See e.g., Dep't of Transp. v. James River Ins. Co., 292 P.3d 118, 123-24 
(Wash. 2013) (holding that the McCarran-Ferguson Act shields a Washington statute 
that prohibits arbitration agreements in insurance contracts from FAA preemption); 
Love v. Money Tree, Inc., 614 S.E.2d 47, 49-50 (Ga. 2005) (holding that the McCar-
ran-Ferguson Act precludes the FAA from preempting a Georgia statue providing 
that arbitration agreements relating to contracts of insurance are invalid); Standard 
Sec. Life Ins. Co. of New York v. West, 267 F.3d 821, 823 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that 
the McCarran-Ferguson Act prevents the FAA from preempting a Missouri statute 
invalidating arbitration agreements in insurance contracts); Mut. Reinsurance Bu~ 
reau v. Great Plains Mut. Ins. Co., Inc., 969 F.2d 931, 935 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding 
that the McCarran-Ferguson Act precludes the FAA's application to a Kansas statute 
invalidating arbitration agreements in insurance contracts); Nat'l Home Ins. Co. v. 
King, 291 F. Supp. 2d 518, 530 (E.D. Ky. 2003) (holding that a Kentucky statute pro-
viding that arbitration agreements in insurance contracts are not enforceable is ex~ 
empt from FAA preemption because of the McCarran-Ferguson Act); Am. Health & 
Life Ins. Co. v. Heyward, 272 F. Supp. 2d. 578, 583 (D. S.C. 2003) (holding that the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act "precludes the application of the FAA to arbitration clauses 
contained in insurance policies governed by South Carolina law" which provides that 
the South Carolina Uniform Arbitration Act shall not apply to "any insured or benefi-
ciary under any insurance policy or annuity contract1'). 
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still allow for full consideration of a state's interest in regulating em-
ployment arbitration so as to ensure a worker's ability to effectively 
vindicate her state statutory rights and, relatedly, to safeguard the 
public policies that ground the state's regulation of the employment 
relationship. Accordingly, this Article proposes that Congress amend 
the FAA to provide for federal agency allowance oversight of state 
regulation of employment arbitration agreements. Specifically, Con-
gress should limit the FAA's preemptive scope by carving out an ex-
ception to section 2 that would allow states to regulate predispute 
employment arbitration agreements subject to the approval of such 
regulation by the U.S. Department of Labor or a similar body. Pursu-
ant to this reform, a state would be authorized to propose employ-
ment arbitration regulations tailored to the specifics of that state's 
employment statutes. A federal overseer with expertise in employ-
ment law would be charged with evaluating any such proposed em-
ployment arbitration regulation by balancing the federal interest in 
promoting arbitration agreements as written with the state interest 
in vindicating state statutory employment rights. The federal over-
seer could approve the proposed regulations, reject them, or condition 
approval on suggested revisions.234 
A model for such federal oversight of state regulation of employ-
ment arbitration already exists in the context of securities arbitra-
tion.235 Pursuant to that scheme, private professional organizations 
called self-regulating organizations ("SRO") have regulated securities 
arbitration under the supervision of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission ("SEC").236 Previously, multiple SROs maintained their 
own rules for arbitrations occurring under their auspices.237 None-
theless, prior to 2007, the vast majority of SRO arbitrations were ad-
ministered by either the National Association of Securities Dealers 
234. For a broad discussion of the delegation to federal agencies of the power to 
waive federal statutory requirements, including consideration of the constitutionality 
and policy implications of such a practice, see David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In 
Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 265 (2013). 
235. See Stipanowich, supra note 1, at 430 (suggesting that "[t]he history of the 
evolution of securities arbitration under the auspices of securities self-regulatory or-
ganizations ... demonstrates how a framework that combines active agency oversight 
of rulemaking and administration with ongoing active debate between advocates for 
investors and brokerage companies can engender a dynamic process that promotes 
greater fairness and response to change"); id. at 384. 
236. See generally Jill I. Gross, McMahon Turns Twenty: The Regulation of Fair-
ness in Securities Arbitration, 76 U. Cm. L. REV. 493, 512-17 (2008). 
237. Constantine N. Katsoris, Roadmap to Securities ADR, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. 
& Frn. L. 413, 420 (2006). 
Spring 2015] FAA Preemption of State Employment Arb 55 
("NASD") or the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE").2 38 In 2007, the 
regulatory functions of the NASD and NYSE, including their arbitra-
tion departments, merged into the Financial Industry Regulatory Au-
thority ("FINRA").239 Today, FINRA administers nearly all 
arbitrations of securities disputes in the United States.240 
Federal securities law, however, grants the SEC the authority to 
oversee SRO rulemaking, including SRO arbitration rulemaking. 
Pursuant to section 19(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 
the SEC must approve any proposed SRO arbitration rule change 
before the rule change may go into effect. 241 An SRO request for a 
rule change is first published in the Federal Register and becomes 
subject to public comment. Before approving any such proposed 
change, the SEC must first determine that the change is consistent 
with the requirements of the Exchange Act and the rules and regula-
tions enacted thereunder and, accordingly, protects investors and is 
in the public interest. 242 The SEC has often required changes in pro-
posed SRO securities arbitration rules in light of concerns raised in 
the public comment process.24 3 
A similar federal allowance oversight scheme relating to state 
regulation of employment arbitration would moderate the extreme 
features embedded in the post-Concepcion, post-Italian Colors Res-
taurant status quo. Under such a scheme, federal arbitration law 
would no longer be indifferent to the undermining effects that an ar-
bitration agreement may have on state public policies. Rather, the 
federal overseer would be specifically charged with considering such 
state interests. Moreover, under such a scheme, states would have an 
incentive to craft moderate arbitration doctrines that accommodate 
rather than foreclose employment arbitration. In sum, compared to 
the status quo, a federal allowance oversight scheme would be a more 
flexible and more thoughtful means for protecting the workplace-re-
lated interests of the state and the interests of workers and employ-
ers who have entered into employment arbitration agreements. 
238. See id. at 525-134 (setting out the number of arbitrations administered by 
various SROs for each year from 1980 through 2005); Constantine N. Katsoris, Secur-
ities Arbitrators Do Not Grow on Trees, 14 FoRDHM! J. CoRP. & FIN. L. 49, 62 (2008) 
(noting that more than 99 percent of the arbitration cases reported filed by the SROs 
in 2005 were administered by the NASD or NYSE). 
239. Katsot'is, supra note 238, at 62-63. 
240. See id. at 64 (noting that "the consolidation of the NASD and NYSE arbitra-
tion programs basically left FINRA as the sole provider of an SRO forum for the reso-
lution of securities disputes") 
241. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(l) (2006). 
242. Id. § 78s(b)(2). 
243. Gross, supra note 236, at 515-17. 
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Federal allowance oversight with respect to a state statute that 
would regulate employment arbitration would begin with a request 
from the state legislature that the federal overseer authorize the em-
ployment arbitration regulation at issue. In the case of a common law 
judicial doctrine, the request would come from the state high court. 
In either case, the state would certify the question to the federal over-
seer in much the same way as a federal court certifies a question of 
state law to a state high court.244 The request might be made either 
at the time of the employment arbitration regulation's promulgation 
or at the time when a court seeks to apply the regulation in such a 
way that the regulation would impact the enforcement of an employ-
ment arbitration agreement. 
An existing agency or set of agencies within the U.S. Department 
of Labor sensibly might serve as the federal overseer. Alternatively, 
the overseer might be a newly created entity situated within the De-
partment of Labor. The Department of Labor would seem an ideal 
location for the oversight task given that the department has situated 
within it expertise with respect to a wide range of workplace rights -
from wage and hour law to workers' leave to nondiscrimination 
mandates. 
Once the state legislature or high court seeks allowance from the 
federal overseer, the overseer would publish the proposed state em-
ployment arbitration regulation in the Federal Register and would 
seek public comment on the regulation. In considering whether to ap-
prove the state employment arbitration regulation, the overseer 
would balance the state's asserted interests in regulating employ-
ment arbitration against the federal interest in the enforcement of 
employment arbitration agreements as written. The overseer would 
then reject the regulation as applied to arbitration contracts within 
the FAA's purview, accept the regulation, or condition approval on 
proposed changes to the regulation. 
The federal allowance oversight scheme should be structured to 
minimize two potential drawbacks. One concern is that the federal 
allowance oversight scheme might delay the start of arbitration for 
parties to an employment arbitration contract subject to regulation 
under the scheme. A second concern is that the federal allowance 
oversight scheme might result in increased costs to such parties. 
244. See, e.g., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 628 F.3d 1191, 1193 (9th Cir. 2011) (certi-
fying a question to the Supreme Court of California); Cal. R. Ct. 8.548 (providing a 
mechanism for the Supreme Court of California to decide a question of California law 
upon a request from the United States Supreme Court, a United States Court of Ap-
peals) or a state's court of last resort). 
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Qjven that a common motivation for entering into an employment ar-
bitration contract is to realize a more expeditious and less expensive 
dispute resolution process, delays and costs arising from the scheme 
should be kept to a minimum. 
To minimize delays in the parties getting to arbitration, state 
legislation impacting employment arbitration should not take effect 
until the federal overseer has approved the legislation. Thus, when 
the state employment arbitration regulation at issue arises from a 
state statute, the federal allowance oversight scheme would not give 
rise to any delay in getting to arbitration. To minimize delays associ-
ated with federal allowance oversight of state employment ai·bitra-
tion regulation arising from common law, the scheme should provide 
for an aggressive timetable for state submission of the doctrine to the 
federal overseer for approval, for publication in the Federal Register, 
for notice and comment, and for final federal overseer action with re-
spect to the doctrine. 
As is the case with federal regulation of securities arbitration, 
the monetary costs of federal allowance oversight of state employ-
ment arbitration regulation are likely to be substantial. 245 It is criti-
cal that the parties to an employment arbitration agreement who 
become involved with the scheme not be asked to shoulder any of the 
direct costs. Imposing such costs on the parties to an employment ar-
bitration agreement would significantly disadvantage arbitration. 
Rather, the state that seeks to safeguard the public interests impli-
cated by its employment regulation and the federal government that 
seeks to promote the federal interest in the enforcement of employ-
ment arbitration agreements should shoulder these costs. 
To more fully appreciate how the proposed scheme might work, 
its potential virtues, and its potential vices, it is useful to consider a 
concrete example. Recall, for this purpose, the statute at issue in 
Perry v. Thomas. 246 The statute at issue there, section 229 of the Cal-
ifornia Labor Code, provided that a worker could maintain in court 
an action for the collection of wages due even if the worker had en-
tered into an arbitration agreement the scope of which encompassed 
the worker's claim.247 
245. See Stipanowich, s1tpra note 1, at 430 (noting that federal regulation of the 
securities industry "entail[s] significant costs, much of whlch today is borne by the 
securities industry"). 
246. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987). 
247. Cal. Lab. Code Ann. § 229. 
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Federal allowance oversight of section 229 might profitably be 
contrasted with the Supreme Court's consideration of the same em-
ployment arbitration regulation in Perry. In holding that the FAA 
preempted section 229, the Court focused solely on the "liberal policy 
favoring arbitration agreements."248 The Court gave little considera-
tion to Thomas's argument that California's interest in protecting its 
workers outweighed the federal interest in the enforcement of arbi-
tration agreements.249 Indeed, one cannot even discern from the 
Court's opinion in Perry what those specific state interests were.250 
Under the proposed federal allowance scheme, however, California's 
interests would be at the center of the preemption analysis. 
At the same time, the broad sweep of section 229 suggests that 
the California legislature gave little consideration in enacting the 
employment arbitration regulation to the federal interest favoring ar-
bitration agreements. Had it done so, it might have crafted a more 
narrow exception to the enforcement of employment arbitration 
agreements. For example, California might have invalidated only ar-
bitration agreements that failed to ensure certain procedural protec-
tions to workers bringing claims for wages owed or might have 
required a judicial forum only for certain small value claims. The pro-
posed federal allowance oversight scheme would give state legisla-
tures an incentive to take a more thoughtful approach to employment 
arbitration regulation in the hope that the federal overseer would ap-
prove the more narrowly tailored exception. 
Finally, the federal allowance oversight scheme should promote 
greater certainty with respect to the enforcement of employment ar-
bitration agreements. Under the proposed scheme, no state regula-
tion of employment arbitration would become operative until the 
federal overseer had approved its application. Thus, the proposed 
scheme should go a long way toward ending the game of preemption 
chess - with the parties to employment arbitration agreements as 
its pawns - that characterizes the status quo.251 
248. Perry, 482 U.S. at 489. 
249. See id. at 486, 489. 
250. Cf. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 131 
(1973) (speculating, despite the "sparse" legislative history, that section 229 "was due, 
apparently, to the legislature's desire to protect the worker from the exploitative em-
ployer who would demand that a prospective employee sign away in advance his right 
to resort to the judicial system for redress of an employment grievance))). 
251. Cf. Stipanowich supra note 1, at 428-29 (arguing that judicial application of 
uncoriscionability doctrine in the arbitration context gives rise to uncertainty and 
that statutory due process standards for arbitration would alleviate this problem). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
An employer's workplace practices may impact not only its 
worker's economic well-being but also her self-concept and social 
standing. Indeed, employment practices may have profound implica-
tions for a worker's social equality and, thus, her ability to partici-
pate as a full and equal citizen in society. Employment practices also 
may help form and maintain social understandings and realities re-
lating to group identity and equality. Thus, state regulation of the 
employment relationship implicates not only private interests but 
also significant public policies and public interests relating to individ-
ual and group identity and equality. 
Employment arbitration has the potential to undermine these 
important public policies and public interests. Employer bargaining 
power and informational advantages rafae the prospect of an em-
ployer imposing on its employee as a condition of employment an ar-
bitration agreement that may impair the ability of the worker to 
vindicate her unwaivable state statutory employment rights. The ar-
bitration agreement that impairs a worker's ability to effectively vin-
dicate her state statutory employment rights simultaneously 
imperils the state public policies and public interests that ground 
those rights. Thus, the state has a strong interest in regulating 
predispute employment arbitration agreements so as to ensure that 
its workers may effectively vindicate their unwaivable state statutory 
employment rights. 
The U.S. Supreme Court's recent FAA jurisprudence makes 
clear, however, that a state's public policy reasons for regulating em-
ployment arbitration are irrelevant to FAA preemption analysis. In-
deed, the Court's most recent FAA jurisprudence obliterates the state 
. effective-vindication exception and with it the state employment arbi-
tration regulation that relies upon the exception. Thus, this jurispru-
dence impairs the ability of states to regulate employment 
arbitration so as to safeguard the public policies and public interests 
that ground state regulation of the employment relationship. 
This Article proposes an amendment to the FAA that would place 
the state public policies and public interests that ground regulation of 
the employment relationship at the center of FAA preemption analy-
sis. In so doing, however, this Article rejects an approach that would 
give states carte blanche to regulate employment arbitration. Such 
an approach would likely result in regulation that undervalues the 
virtues of employment arbitration and, thus, gives insufficient weight 
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to the interest of employers and employees in the enforcement of em-
ployment arbitration agreements. Rather, this Article proposes a 
middle-of-the-road approach that combines a federal openness to con-
sider state interests in regulating employment arbitration with a fed-
eral check on such state regulation focused on protecting the interest 
of employers and employees in the enforcement of predispute employ-
ment arbitration agreements. 
